51 / 388
INTRODUCTION
27
positivists demanded objective methods with preconceived
standards and measurements free from social construction and
human values. Therefore, it considered the deductive nomological
explanation as a general method in any scientific research and
judged other methods which involved human interpretation or
subjective judgements as nonscientific. It was maintained that
ane cannot do any scientific inquiry without
having
a hypothesis,
or a problem, or a prejudice to guide the observations
A
.
However, ane of course uses subjective judgements in choosing the
hypotheses and inquiry indicators in any research
æ
. The role of
judgement is in deciding what is important, but not in deciding
what is true.
Applying this positivist way of investigation in the field
of human-built environment science showed its limits in
explaining fact/value relationships. As a consequence the
positivist definition of knowledge was changed in a dramatic
shift in the conception of science, from searching for absolutely
certain knowledge to finding the best explanation available�.
This
postpositivism
was developed by different movements such as
linguistic approach
M
, and Hermeneutic philosophy
65
• It proposes
also that knowledge is not cumulative but it is progressive. The
truth in postposistivism is not ane thing but an increasing
Hills.
143.
61
Popper, Karl, 1986,
The Poverty of Historicism,
ARK, London. pp. 130-
62
Mo, Linn,
Is Field Work Scientific.
In The Journal of Mind and Behavior,
Winter 1981, Vol. 2, No. 4. p. 407.
�Lather, Patti,
Research as Praxis.
In Harvard Educational Review, Vol.
56, No. 3 August 1986. p. 259.
�Kuhn, T.S., 1962,
The Structure of Scientific Revolution,
University of
Chicago Press, Chicago.
Hesse, M., 1980,
Revolution and Reconstruction in the Philosophy of
Science,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
�Heidegger, Martin, 1968,
Brev om Humanismen,
J.W. Cappelens Forlag,
Oslo.
-1975,
Poetry, Language, Thought,
Harper & Row Publishers, New York.