Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis <p>Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (EiP) is a scholarly journal of applied ethics and related political theory. EiP aims to create a broad-based and unique journal for Nordic research within ethics. The contributions may focus on ethical, political or social aspects of scientific and technological developments within different fields, research ethics, and normative power, democracy and culture analyses. The journal provides a meeting place for applied ethics, be it within biotechnology, research, primary and secondary education, childhood, the Internet, culture, nature, business life, sports, the media, medicine, politics or elsewhere.&nbsp;EiP is double-blind peer reviewed and is published open access two times per year in May and November. It is currently level 1 in the&nbsp;<a href="https://dbh.nsd.uib.no/publiseringskanaler/KanalTidsskriftInfo?id=470904&amp;bibsys=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Norwegian scientific classification system</a>.</p> <p>Views expressed in the Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics are those of the authors and not necessarily those of its editors or publisher.</p> NTNU Open Access Journals en-US Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 1890-3991 <div><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', serif;">Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:</span></div><div><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', serif;">Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" target="_blank">Creative Commons Attribution License</a> that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', serif;">Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', serif;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', serif;">Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See <a href="http://opcit.eprints.org/oacitation-biblio.html" target="_blank">The Effect of Open Access</a>).</span></div> Special Issue on Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Migration: Ethics of Inclusion and Exclusion https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2867 <p>The contributors to this issue offer applied critical and normative perspectives on central, yet overlooked, ethical aspects of migration management with a certain cosmopolitan lance in some capacity. However, cosmopolitanism might mean different things for transnational migration. It can refer to “political cosmopolitanism” that provides the reasons for why there should be certain global institutions governing migration. It can also refer to “moral cosmopolitanism” that simply represents a moral concern for individual rights and interests first and foremost (Caney 2005). Cosmopolitanism can also work as a lens that is based on a scepticism towards using the nation-state as the ultimate unit or locus of analysis. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and the contributions in this special issue accommodate a form of cosmopolitan outlook or stance to some extent in their discussion on migration management practices.</p> Yusuf Yuksekdag Elin Palm ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-23 2018-11-23 2 1 5 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2867 Obligations in public philosophical discourse https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2868 <p>Four papers are included in this November 2018 special issue Open Section. First is by Bjørn Hofmann and Siri Granum Carson titled <em>Filosofiens rolle i det offentlige ordskiftet: Hvordan har debatten om sorteringssamfunnet i 2017 påvirket forholdet mellom filosofi og samfunn? En innholdsanalyse</em> (The role of philosophy in public debate - A content analysis of the debate on the "sorting society" in Norway in 2017). Second,&nbsp;<em>Provokativ offentlig filosofi</em> (Provocative Public Philosophy) by Aksel Braanen Sterri.&nbsp; Third,&nbsp;Steinar Bøyum’s <em>The Democratic Duty to Educate Oneself.</em> And fourth,&nbsp;Jonas Jakobsen and Kjersti Fjørtoft’s <em>In defence of moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas.</em>&nbsp;</p> Allen Alvarez May Thorseth Siri Granum Carson ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-23 2018-11-23 2 7 9 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2868 Towards fairer borders: Alleviating global inequality of opportunity https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2421 <p>Current admission criteria for migrants in Western states tend to favor the well-to-do, able-bodied, and well-qualified. This leads to migration patterns that exacerbate global inequalities. In this article, I will consider how economic migration affects global inequality of opportunity, and how we might alter admission criteria in order to mitigate negative effects. I will proceed by discussing cosmopolitan and nationalist positions to open borders and economic migration. In particular, I will address David Miller’s objections to using open borders to remedy global inequality of opportunity. The argument I present agrees with the benefits of a conception of justice that allows for degrees of partiality and a state’s right to control their borders. However, I argue that Western states’ roles in perpetuating global inequality of opportunity leads to moral demands, which can in part be met by fair economic migration. Furthermore, I will consider what fairer economic migration might consist in. The model I propose would rank migrants based on their level of disadvantage, how little their emigration would affect the country they are emigrating from, and how great it might improve the opportunities in the country they are moving to.</p> Magnus Skytterholm Egan ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-12 2018-11-12 2 11 26 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2421 Who should be granted electoral rights at the state level? https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2411 <p class="p1">This paper has a twofold aim in determining who should be granted electoral rights at the state level, one negative and another positive. The negative part deconstructs the link between state-level political membership and citizenship and contests naturalization procedures. This approach argues that naturalization procedures, when coercively used as a necessary condition for accessing electoral rights at the state level, are both inconsistent with liberal democratic ideals and an inexcusable practice in liberal democratic states. The positive part of the paper seeks to establish what – if not the acquisition of citizenship –could determine state-level political membership for non-citizens. In other words, it attempts to explain how and in what conditions non-citizens may
become political members of a state without naturalizing. This approach considers the most prominent arguments that base state-level political membership on residency, i.e. residency as a legal status granted by the previous members of the community and residency as physical presence within a defined jurisdiction. It argues that, in a world of increasing human mobility across borders, while the former way of understanding residency might be too restrictive, the latter might be too banal to forge membership ties that form a political community. Domicile is the proposed alternative, introduced as a type of residency that is self-given and remains stable despite numerous changes of
residency. Domicile is a legal term that indicates where a person officially registers her permanent home even when residing abroad. In sum, this is an argument against naturalization as the access door for electoral rights at the state level and in favor of defining membership in the political community based on domicile.</p> Melina Duarte ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-12 2018-11-12 2 27 45 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2411 The "imaginary world" of nationalistic ethics: Feasibility constraints on Nordic deportation corridors targeting unaccompanied Afghan minors https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2425 <p>This article examines Swedish, Danish and Norwegian governments’ participation in the European Return Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM) project and its failed attempts to deport unaccompanied minors (UAMs) to Afghanistan. It argues that ERPUM is an interesting and urgent case of a “deportation corridor”, and suggests that this framework can benefit from analysis through normative and applied ethics and in particular discussions of feasibility constraints. It therefore identifies and critically assesses two nationalistic arguments for deportation common in Nordic politics, based on appeals credibility and humanitarianism. Considering the growth of nationalistic immigration policies in Nordic states, the article turns the usual discussions of feasibility on its head by showing that not only cosmopolitan, but also nationalistic ethics must face up to charges of lacking realism. More specifically, it argues that the case of ERPUM illustrates how nationalistic deportation ethics can rely on inconsistent normative and erroneous empirical assumptions, which can be criticized for their arbitrariness, ideological grounding and lacking feasibility.</p> Martin Lemberg-Pedersen ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-13 2018-11-13 2 47 68 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2425 How to Understand Limitations of the Right to Exit with Respect to Losses Associated with Health Worker Emigration: A Clarification https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2433 <p>There is a recent interest in the ethics of high-skilled worker emigration through which the limitations of the right to exit are discussed. Insightful arguments have been made in favour of (or against) the emigration restrictions on skilled workers in order to tackle the deprivations in developing countries. However, there is still a need for clarification on how we can understand, discuss and implement limitations of a right from a normative perspective. Significantly, how we understand the limitation of a right might determine how we approach such limitations – both in terms of the process of assessing the limitations and in terms of their implications. In this paper, I identify two distinct ways to understand limitations of the right to exit with respect to losses associated with health worker emigration, while also pointing to their implications for restrictive policies: (i) as a matter of scope, and (ii) as a matter of weight or emergency, which requires a compensatory scheme for the individual right holders. While the emergency restrictions seem to be a point of convergence in the literature, what defines an emergency and the nature of the compensation still warrant exploration. To that end, I also discuss from a normative perspective what might constitute a public emergency that would give states a prima facie prerogative to regulate temporary limitations on the exercise of the right to exit. In addition, I briefly introduce the implications of emergency restrictions, with a particular focus on compensatory schemes for individual right holders.</p> Yusuf Yuksekdag ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 2 69 86 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2433 Filosofiens rolle i det offentlige ordskifte https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2517 <p><em>Filosofi og etikk har fått en stadig større plass i det offentlige rom i Norge. 2017 ble et år der filosofer sørget for overskrifter i en rekke norske medier. En av sakene som fikk størst oppmerksomhet, var debatten om sorteringssamfunnet og Aksel Braanen Sterris påstand om at personer med Downs syndrom ikke kan leve fullverdige liv. Utsagnet skapte en voldsom debatt og kraftige reaksjoner. Temaet for debatten er interessant i seg selv, men den reiser også spørsmål om hvordan slike debatter endrer filosofiens anseelse og rolle i det offentlige ordskiftet i Norge. I denne artikkelen stiller vi derfor spørsmålet: På hvilken måte har debatten om sorteringssamfunnet i 2017 påvirket forholdet mellom filosofi og samfunn? Som perspektiv for analysen anvender vi tradisjonelle kvalitetskriterier innen filosofi, slik som konsistens, klare premisser og evnen til å klargjøre begreper, fremstille motargumenter og begrunne grenser. Vi finner at debatten om sorteringssamfunnet utvilsomt har gitt filosofien mer oppmerksomhet i det offentlige ordskiftet, og at filosofisk argumentasjon kan bidra til å løfte frem skjulte problemstillinger og sette ord på uuttalte intuisjoner, samt å stimulere til bedre argumentasjon. Dette bør hilses velkommen. Samtidig finner vi at filosofiens tilpasning til mediediskursen fører til at akademiske forbehold tradisjonelle kvalitetskrav og nyansering forsvinner. Dersom skjulte premisser, manglende konsistens, begrepslige og vurderingsmessige uklarheter, samt ignorering av empiriske premisser, motargumenter og viktige implikasjoner blir utbredt, vil resultatet kunne bli en fattigere offentlig debatt, et dårligere samfunn og et svekket omdømme for filosofien. Løsningen må være at vi som fagpersoner er villige til å gjøre klart og grundig rede for våre påstander, perspektiver, premisser, argumenter og konklusjoner, og at vi bør revidere eller trekke dem tilbake dersom vi ikke makter å gjøre dette. Ellers står vi i fare for å gjøre filosofien til en form for «villedningskunst» – en ny form for sofisme – og et lett bytte for platonsk fordømmelse.</em></p> <p><em><strong>Nøkkelord:</strong> Filosofisk argumentasjon, offentlig debatt, sorteringssamfunnet, Downs syndrom, konsekvensetikk</em></p> <p><strong>English summary:</strong> The role of philosophy in public debate - A content analysis of the debate on the "sorting society" in Norway in 2017</p> <p>Philosophy and ethics has recently gained increased attention in Norway. During 2017 philosophers hit the headlines in Norwegian media. One of the issues that gained most attention was the debate on “the differentiation/sorting society” (sorteringssamfunnet). The debate was sparked by Aksel Braanen Sterri’s statement that persons with Downs’s syndrome cannot live full lives related to the issue of introducing non-invasive prenatal screening (NIPT). While the debate is interesting in terms of its content, we will in this article focus on in what way the debate in 2017 has affected the relationship between philosophy and society, in particular the role and reputation of philosophy in public debates. To analyse the debate we apply traditional quality criteria within philosophy such as consistency, clear premises and the ability to clarify concepts, present counter-arguments and limitations. We find that the debate about “the sorting society” undoubtedly has given philosophy more public attention, and that philosophers can help raise covert or forgotten issues and explicate unspoken intuitions, as well as stimulate improved argumentation. This should be welcomed. At the same time, we find that philosophy's adaptation to the media discourse eliminates academic reservations and nuances. If hidden assumptions, lack of consistency, conceptual and evaluative uncertainties, as well as ignorance of empirical premises, counter-arguments, and important implications become widespread, the result could be a poorer public debate, an impoverished society, and a weakened reputation for philosophy. One solution is that we as professionals are willing to make our claims, perspectives, arguments, and conclusions clear and comprehensible, and that we are willing to revise or withdraw them if we are not able to do so. Otherwise, philosophy may become a form of "art of deception" - a new form of sophism - and an easy target for Platonic criticism.</p> <p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Philosophical argumentation, public debate, discrimination, Down's syndrome, consequentialism</p> Bjørn Hofmann Siri Granum Carson ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-09-28 2018-09-28 2 87 103 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2517 Provokativ offentlig filosofi https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2539 <p><em>En uttalelse om at personer med Downs syndrom ikke kan leve fullverdige liv, satte i gang en stor og opphetet debatt i den norske offentligheten i 2017. Denne ga opphav til en mer overordnet debatt om hva akademikere bør og ikke bør si i offentligheten. En viss form for offentlig filosofi, det jeg vil kalle provokativ offentlig filosofi, er blitt utpekt som synder. I denne artikkelen vil jeg, med utgangspunkt i debatten om fullverdige liv, forsvare provokativ offentlig filosofi mot både epistemiske og etiske innvendinger.</em></p> <p><strong>Nøkkelord:</strong> Filosofisk argumentasjon, offentlig debatt, offentlig filosofi, sorteringssamfunnet, Downs syndrom, fullverdige liv, eugenikk</p> <p><strong>English summary:</strong> Provocative Public Philosophy</p> <p>In 2017, I argued that people with Down syndrome cannot live full lives. This sparked a heated debated in the Norwegian public sphere. This gave rise to a debate over what academics should and should not say in public. A certain form of public philosophy, what I will call provocative public philosophy, was criticized for being harmful, imperialistic, for eroding trust in philosophers, and for creating too much noise. In this article I will, in light of the Down syndrome debate, defend provocative public philosophy against these allegations.&nbsp;</p> <p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Philosophical argumentation, public debate, public philosophy, Down syndrome, eugenics</p> Aksel Braanen Sterri ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-12 2018-11-12 2 105 128 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2539 The Democratic Duty to Educate Oneself https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2515 <p>I argue that democratic citizens have a duty to educate themselves politically. My argument proceeds in two stages. First, I establish a case for the moral importance of individual competence for voting, but also maintain that the substantial content of the required competence must remain open. I do this by way of an assessment of Jason Brennan's provocative defense of epistocracy. I try to show that there is no notion of political competence that can meet with reasonable agreement among citizens and that voter qualification exams are therefore illegitimate. Second, I maintain that the basic premise of Brennan's argument, the right to a competent electorate, is valid and that it corresponds to an individual duty to educate oneself politically. This duty is, in Kant's terminology, a wide and imperfect duty that we owe to our fellow democratic citizens. Yet since the content of competence must be left open, this moral duty cannot be transformed into a legal obligation.</p> Steinar Bøyum ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-12 2018-11-12 2 129 141 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2515 In Defense of Moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2267 <p><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">The paper discusses Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of deliberative democracy, focusing on the question of religious reasons in political discourse. Whereas Rawls as well as Habermas defend a fully inclusivist position on the use of religious reasons in the ‘background culture’ (Rawls) or ‘informal public sphere’ (Habermas), we defend a moderately inclusivist position. Moderate inclusivism welcomes religiously inspired contributions to public debate, but it also makes normative demands on public argumentation beyond the ‘public forum’ (Rawls) or ‘formal public sphere’ (Habermas). In particular, moderate inclusivism implies what we call a ‘conversational translation proviso’ according to which citizens have a duty to supplement religious with proper political arguments if – but only if – they are asked to do so by their co-discussants. This position, we argue, is more in line with the deeper intuitions behind Rawls’ political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative model than is the fully inclusivist alternative. </span></p> <p><strong>Keywords</strong>: conversational translation proviso, deliberative democracy, ethics of citizenship, Habermas, moderate inclusivism, public reason, Rawls</p> Jonas Jakobsen Kjersti Fjørtoft ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-17 2018-11-17 2 143 157 10.5324/eip.v12i2.2267 Bidragsyterne - Contributors https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2871 Redaksjon Etikk i praksis ##submission.copyrightStatement## http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2018-11-26 2018-11-26 2