https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/issue/feed Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 2019-08-19T09:58:31+00:00 The Editors redaksjon_eip@hf.ntnu.no Open Journal Systems <p>Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (EiP) is a scholarly journal of applied ethics and related political theory. EiP aims to create a broad-based and unique journal for Nordic research within ethics. The contributions may focus on ethical, political or social aspects of scientific and technological developments within different fields, research ethics, and normative power, democracy and culture analyses. The journal provides a meeting place for applied ethics, be it within biotechnology, research, primary and secondary education, childhood, the Internet, culture, nature, business life, sports, the media, medicine, politics or elsewhere.&nbsp;EiP is double-blind peer reviewed and is published open access two times per year in May and November. It is currently level 1 in the&nbsp;<a href="https://dbh.nsd.uib.no/publiseringskanaler/KanalTidsskriftInfo?id=470904&amp;bibsys=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Norwegian scientific classification system</a>.</p> <p>Views expressed in the Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics are those of the authors and not necessarily those of its editors or publisher.</p> https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/3060 Finding balance in normative toolkits 2019-08-19T09:58:22+00:00 Allen Alvarez allen.alvarez@ntnu.no May Thorseth may.thorseth@ntnu.no Siri Granum Carson siri.granum.carson@ntnu.no <p>This issue provides readers the opportunity to broaden understanding of methods used in applied ethics. We hope you will be inspired to decide on which method, or a combination of different ones, to use towards achieving reflective balance that can enhance understanding of all considerations relevant to deciding what should be done. Like tools, methods are used because they are well suited to the task we seek to accomplish. &nbsp;</p> 2019-05-14T15:55:33+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2726 Lessons of Reproductive Ethics for Principlism 2019-08-19T09:58:31+00:00 Morten Dige filmd@cas.au.dk <p>This article brings together two debates in bioethics more substantively than has been the case until now. One is the methodological debate over "principlism," i.e., the theoretical framework for analyzing and solving (bio)ethical problems proposed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics (PBE). The other is the normative debate about reproductive ethics, i.e., procreative rights and obligations in a time of pervasive opportunities for making detailed choices about the properties and capacities of future people. The obvious point of bringing the debates together is to show how they can illuminate each other in fruitful ways consistent with the method of reflective equilibrium endorsed in PBE. Furthermore, discussions of reproductive ethics is almost absent in PBE, making it an interesting "test case" on how principlist theory can have an impact on and be affected by confrontations with new practices and considerations in biomedicine. Reproductive ethics is especially interesting due to the so-called non-identity considerations, which pose a challenge to common morality views on harm to and respect for persons. My focus is mainly on some methodological points about the import of concrete normative discussions for formulating basic normative principles. However, I unfold a number of substantial points in order to demonstrate this. It is my impression that most writers on principlism underestimate the effect of engaging with concrete problems. Specifically, I conclude that reflecting on procreative obligations provides strong reasons for specifying the basic principles in ways that uncover new dimensions of them and not just new applications.</p> <p><strong>Key words:&nbsp;</strong>principlism, reproductive ethics, non-identity problem, nonmaleficence, respect for persons</p> 2018-11-12T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2547 A Values-based Methodology in Policing 2019-08-19T09:58:23+00:00 Jens Erik Paulsen jens.erik.paulsen@phs.no <p style="font-weight: 400;">Professional work is currently based on explicit knowledge and evidence to a greater degree than in the past. Standardising professional services in this way requires repetitive (or at least similar) scenarios and might be seen as a challenge to professional autonomy. In the context of policing, officers perform a range of familiar tasks, but they may also encounter novel challenges at any moment. Moreover, police tasks are not well-defined. Therefore, many missions require police officers to rely on common sense, tacit knowledge or gut feeling. In this article, I argue that a values-based methodology may serve as a tool to help evaluate decisions in unfamiliar situations, to learn from experience, as well as be a quality control for established routines.</p> <p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Keywords:</strong><span style="font-weight: 400;">&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">ethics, policing, decision-making, values, experiential learning</span>routines.</p> 2019-05-14T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2749 Energy Scenarios and Justice Towards Future Humans 2019-08-19T09:58:25+00:00 Anders Melin anders.melin@mau.se David Kronlid david.kronlid@edu.uu.se <p style="font-weight: 400;">Energy production and consumption give rise to issues of justice for future humans. By analysing a specific case – Swedish energy politics – this article contributes to the discussion of how consideration for future humans should affect energy policy making. It outlines three different energy scenarios for the period 2035-2065 – the nuclear-renewables, the renewables-low and the renewables-high scenarios – and assesses them from the point of view of justice for future individuals by using the capabilities approach as a normative framework. We cannot make a definitive assessment of the different scenarios due to the great uncertainties involved in determining the impacts on individuals living between 2035 and 2065 and individuals born thereafter, but we still conclude that we have certain reasons to prefer the renewables-low scenario since it avoids certain risks connected with the other scenarios. The economic growth in this scenario is lower than in the others, but we question whether this is a disadvantage from the point of view of the capabilities approach.</p> <p style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Keywords:</strong>&nbsp;energy scenarios, justice, future generations, capabilities approach</p> 2019-03-31T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2525 Responsibility for Assisted Living Technologies 2019-08-19T09:58:25+00:00 Erik Thorstensen Erik.Thorstensen@afi.hioa.no <p>The approach to innovations known as Responsible research and innovation (RRI) aims to move the innovation system towards creating products that strive to realize social values along with economic benefits. This paper discusses the systematic assessment of assistive technologies in order for them to meet the aims expressed in RRI. A central issue in the discussion is how to facilitate an integration of insights from the discourse on RRI with more established assessment approaches such as Health Technology Assessment (HTA). Based on the literature on existing socio-ethical assessment tools, I investigate how these tools can be combined with HTA and how they can add perspectives from RRI that might increase the socio-ethical value of assistive technologies. Through a discussion on how to understand RRI, HTA, assessment and integration, I suggest a list of four possible approaches that have the potential to be applied as assessment approaches that integrate insights from RRI and HTA. These are then evaluated on their ability to address issues that have emerged from a literature review on RRI and assistive technologies, on empirical studies in this technology field and on their product focus. In conclusion, I argue that the Ethical Impact Assessment, the Socratic approach, the Ethical Matrix, and the HTA Core Model seem to be the most promising methodologies, but that these need adjustments to cover substantive themes from RRI.</p> <p><strong>Keywords:</strong> energy scenarios, justice, future generations, capabilities approach</p> 2019-05-10T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/2876 Moderate Conventionalism and Cultural Appropriation 2019-08-19T09:58:24+00:00 Juha Räikkä jraikka@utu.fi Mikko Puumala mikko.puumala@utu.fi <p>Cultural appropriation, also called cultural borrowing, has been the topic of much discussion in recent years. Roughly speaking, cultural appropriation happens when someone outside of a cultural or ethnic group takes or uses some object that is characteristic or in some way important to the group without the group’s permission. Individuals who find cultural appropriation (or borrowing) unproblematic have often argued that if we express moral criticism of the use of traditional Sami outfits by non-Sami, then we are logically committed to criticize all kinds of habits that are clearly acceptable –such as using jeans, eating pizza or drinking tea. However, we will argue that in many cases that objection is problematic. We point out that if one social habit or practice is prohibited (or supported) by existing social conventions but another is not, then there is a convention difference between the cases. The convention difference is in turn a morally relevant difference, or so we aim to show. We refer to “moderate conventionalism,” according to which existing social conventions are morally relevant facts that should be taken into account when choosing how to act, whatever the content of the conventions happens to be. The claim is analogous with the traditional view that laws have some moral relevance and binding force independent of their content.</p> <p><strong>Keywords:</strong> cultural appropriation, conventionalism, moderate conventionalism, convention difference</p> 2019-05-10T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/3002 Abort og fosterreduksjon: En etisk sammenligning 2019-08-19T09:58:26+00:00 Silje Langseth Dahl silje.langseth.dahl@gmail.com Rebekka Hylland Vaksdal rvaksdal@gmail.com Mathias Barra Mathias.barra@ahus.no Espen Gamlund espen.gamlund@uib.no Carl Tollef Solberg carl.solberg@uib.no <p><em>De siste årene har fosterreduksjon i økende grad vært gjenstand for debatt i Norge, og intensiteten nådde et foreløpig maksimum da Lovavdelingen leverte tolknings-uttalelsen § 2 - Tolkning av abortloven i 2016 som svar på at Helse- og omsorgs-departementet (i 2014) ba Lovavdelingen om å vurdere hvorvidt Lov om svangers-kapsavbrudd åpner for fosterreduksjon av friske fostre ved flerlings-vangerskap. Lovavdelingen konkluderte med at abortloven åpner for fosterreduksjon ved flerlingsvangerskap innenfor de rammene som loven ellers oppstiller. Debatten har ikke stilnet, og utover høsten 2018 ble den ytterligere tilspisset i forbindelse med KrFs veivalg og signaler fra Høyre om å vurdere å fjerne § 2.3c, samt å forby fosterreduksjon.</em></p> <p><em>Mange av argumentene i fosterreduksjonsdebatten fremstår tilsynelatende like de argumentene som verserer i abortdebatten, og det mangler en analyse av hva som stiller seg annerledes ved fosterreduksjon. Målet med denne artikkelen er følgelig å undersøke hvorvidt det finnes en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom abort og fosterreduksjon av friske fostre. Vi tar for oss typiske argumenter fra den norske debatten, og belyser dem med fagartikler fra forskningslitteraturen. De mest sentrale argumentene mot fosterreduksjon har vi identifisert som skadeargumentet, skråplansargumentet, intensjonsargumentet, sorgargumentet, psykologiske langtids-effekter for kvinnen og sorteringsargumentet. Vi kommer frem til at motargumentene ikke holder mål hva gjelder å påvise en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom abort og fosterreduksjon av friske fostre. Konklusjonen vår er derfor at det – på tross av hva flere debattanter synes å mene </em><em>-</em><em> ikke finnes en moralsk relevant forskjell mellom de to. Når vi derfor tillater abort, så bør vi også tillate fosterreduksjon.</em></p> <p><strong>Nøkkelord:</strong> Abort, etikk, fosterreduksjon, medisinsk etikk, selektiv fosterreduksjon</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p><strong>English summary:</strong> Abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction: An ethical comparison&nbsp;</p> <p>During recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction has increasingly been subject to debate in Norway, and this debate reached an apex when the Legislation Department delivered the interpretation statement <em>§ 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act</em> in 2016 in response to the Ministry of Health and Care Services, who had (in 2014) requested the Legislation Department to assess whether the Abortion Act allowed for multifetal pregnancy reductions of healthy fetuses. The Legislation Department concluded that the Abortion Act does regulate and permit multifetal pregnancy reductions within the framework that the law otherwise stipulates. The debate has not subsided, and in the autumn of 2018, it was further intensified in connection with the Norwegian Christian Democratic Party´s (KrF) "crossroads choice" and the signals from the Norwegian Conservative Party that they would consider reverting the Abortion Act’s section 2.3c [regulating second trimester abortions due to fetal anomalies], as well as a ban on multifetal pregnancy reduction.</p> <p>Many of the arguments in the multifetal pregnancy reduction debate appear very similar to the arguments pending in the general abortion debate, and an analysis of what makes multifetal pregnancy reduction significantly different from abortion is wanting. The aim of this article is, accordingly, to investigate to what extent there is a morally relevant distinction between abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction of healthy fetuses. We take on board typical arguments from the Norwegian debate and consider them in light of the scholarly literature. We have identified the most central arguments against multifetal pregnancy reduction as the harm argument, the slippery slope argument, the intent argument, the grief argument, the regret argument (concerning long-term psychological effects for the woman), and the sorting argument. We argue that these counter-arguments do not succeed in establishing a morally relevant difference between abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction of healthy fetuses. Our conclusion is, therefore – that despite what is often held – there is no morally significant difference between the two. Therefore, when we allow abortion, we should also allow multifetal pregnancy reductions.</p> <p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Abortion, ethics, fetal reduction, medical ethics, multifetal pregnancy reduction</p> 2019-03-29T00:00:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/3061 Bidragsyterne - Contributors 2019-05-18T08:52:40+00:00 The Editors redaksjon_eip@hf.ntnu.no 2019-05-16T12:51:00+00:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement##