Etikk i
praksis. Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (2021), 15(2), 63-65 |
http://dx.doi.org/10.5324/eip.v15i2.4083 |
Early View publication date:
1 September 2021 |
Comments
on Rozas
Krister Bykvist
As Rozas points out, we
seem to have different intuitions about
when the interests of contingent future
people can outweigh those of already
existing ones. In Happy Child the
parents have no reason to create the
child because the positive wellbeing of
the possible child seems not to outweigh
the loss in wellbeing for the parents,
even though the child’s positive
wellbeing is greater than the combined
losses of the parents. In Wretched
Child, by contrast, it seems that the
negative wellbeing of the possible child
does outweigh the gains for the parents
and that the parents therefore should
not create the child. How can the
wellbeing of the happy child matter so
little when the wellbeing of the
wretched child matters a lot? Rozas
argues that the intuitively satisfactory
answer to this question is given by what
he calls the ‘Asymmetry between Positive
and Negative Value’ (‘Asymmetry’, for
short), which states that ‘given a
correlation between the intensity and
the duration of a value and a disvalue,
disvalue outweighs value and thus should
be given greater consideration when
assessing outcomes’ (Rozas 2021, page
45). The wellbeing of the possible child
in Wretched Child matters less than the
wellbeing of the parents because the
possible child would have negative
wellbeing, which, according to
Asymmetry, would count more than the
gains in positive wellbeing for the
parents. The explanation of why
Asymmetry would say that they have no
reason to create the happy child is less
clear. We are told that views that
satisfy Asymmetry do not
need to accept that we should bring into
existence The Happy Child. Fully
Asymmetrical Views, as well as a number
of Weighted Asymmetrical Views such as
the Deontological or Satisficing ones we
have considered, would reject that we
have reasons to create The Happy Child
in any case. That is, they would accept
this even under an unrealistic
idealizing condition according to which
bringing the Happy Child into existence
would not cause any disvalue at all.
Other Asymmetric Views would be
compatible with accepting the creation
of The Happy Child only under this
unrealistic condition. But they would
reject it in the real world, where in
all likelihood the creation of the Happy
Child, as described, would come at the
cost of greater suffering, and such
suffering would not be compensated by
the increase in positive value. (Rozas
2021, page 46) It is clear that fully
asymmetrical views that give no
weight to positive value would say that
the parents have no reason to create a
uniformly happy child. But it less clear
why deontological and satisficing
asymmetrical views would say so. Indeed,
it is unclear exactly what these views
say. Rozas does not give us any
definitions of these views. As I
understand him, and here I expand on
what he says, these views claim that,
when we assess the value of
outcomes, positive value matters, but
less so than negative value; however, we
do not always have reason to
promote positive value. According to the
deontological view, you are permitted
but not required to bring about the best
outcome given that it does not violate
any deontological constraints. According
to the satisficing version, you are
permitted but not required to bring
about an outcome that is more than
sufficiently overall good (or,
alternatively, contains a more than
sufficiently amount of positive value).
Even though creating the happy child
would bring about the best consequences,
as long as no deontological constraint
is at stake, the parents are permitted
but not required to create the child,
according to the deontological view.
According to the satisficing view, if
not creating the child would bring about
an outcome the value of which is
sufficiently good (overall or in terms
of positive value), the parents are
permitted but not required to bring
about the even better outcome in which
there is an extra happy life.
It is true that cases in which a happy child is uniformly happy are unrealistic, but so are the cases Rozas discusses, since no other person beyond the parents and the child is supposed to be affected by the parents’ choice. If the game we are playing invokes unrealistic examples, then it should be fine to invoke one in which the happy child would be uniformly happy, and here Rozas’ solution will fail to deliver the intuitively right verdict. Our intuition that we lack reason to create happy people at the cost of wellbeing for already existing people does not vanish when we are told that the extra happy people will have uniformly happy lives. Indeed, the more general intuition is that we have no or little reason to create overall happy people but strong reason not to create overall unhappy people. This intuition cannot be explained by Rozas’ asymmetric framework. That being said, I welcome his clear and bold approach to a difficult area in population ethics. It is an area rife with paradoxes and dilemmas and it is clear that no solution can be satisfactory in all respects. Some of our pet intuitions have to be abandoned.
Rozas, M. (2021).
Two asymmetries in population
and general normative ethics. Etikk
i Praksis - Nordic Journal of
Applied Ethics, 15(1),
41-49. CrossRef
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