Energy production and consumption give rise to issues of justice for future humans. By analysing a specific case – Swedish energy politics – this article contributes to the discussion of how consideration for future humans should affect energy policy making. It outlines three different energy scenarios for the period 2035-2065 – the nuclear-renewables, the renewables-low and the renewables-high scenarios – and assesses them from the point of view of justice for future individuals by using the capabilities approach as a normative framework. We cannot make a definitive assessment of the different scenarios due to the great uncertainties involved in determining the impacts on individuals living between 2035 and 2065 and individuals born thereafter, but we still conclude that we have certain reasons to prefer the renewables-low scenario since it avoids certain risks connected with the other scenarios. The economic growth in this scenario is lower than in the others, but we question whether this is a disadvantage from the point of view of the capabilities approach.

Keywords: energy scenarios, justice, future generations, capabilities approach

 

Introduction

Though the use of energy is a pre-supposition for a modern life style, it also gives rise to issues of justice for future humans.¹ All energy sources – nuclear energy, fossil fuels as well as renewables – have some possible negative impacts on the lives of future humans. There are strong moral reasons to consider these impacts, both from the points of view of Utilitarianism and of deontological theories (Thompson 2009, Tremmel 2014). The first purpose of this article is to contribute to the ethical debate concerning how our duties to future humans should affect energy policy making by focusing on a specific country, Sweden (our home-country).  Since the Second World War, the choice of energy technologies has been one of the most controversial political issues in Sweden. For example, some political parties have argued for the continued use of nuclear power, while others have argued for a quick phase-out (Anshelm 2000). The reason for choosing to study a specific country is that political decisions about energy use are mainly made at the national level today. Therefore, it seems reasonable to analyse the policy options in a particular country. Moreover, it is difficult to draw any general conclusions about which energy scenarios are preferable since feasible energy scenarios are dependent on the political, social and ecological conditions in a country. For example, Sweden has a larger potential for hydroelectric power than many other countries, due to the many large rivers in the north of the country. In addition, the impacts of different energy scenarios are also dependent on the specific social and ecological conditions in a country. We outline three different energy scenarios (for a discussion of the use of scenarios in energy research, see Paltsev 2017) and analyse how they can be assessed from the point of view of justice for future humans. The focus on energy scenarios, rather than on a single energy technology, is motivated by the fact that it is problematic to make an ethical assessment of a single energy technology in isolation. This is because phasing out one specific energy technology will certainly require replacing it with another energy technology that has its own drawbacks as long as we want to maintain a certain level of energy production and consumption (Hillerbrand 2015).

The second purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate on how the capabilities approach can be applied to questions of justice to future humans, especially in the context of energy policy making. This approach is Martha Nussbaum’s version of an approach or theory that, in its more general form, can be denoted as the capability approach or capabilities theory (Robeyns 2016, Holland 2014). It has become increasingly influential as an approach to issues of social justice, such as questions concerning gender inequality (Walker, Berekashvili, Lomidze 2014), and recently it has been applied to issues concerning our responsibility towards future individuals (Watene 2013). Consequently, it is of great interest to examine how it can be used in the context of energy policy making. A few attempts have been made to apply the capabilities approach to the issue of energy policy making and justice, for example, by analysing how different capabilities are affected by limited access to energy and the negative environmental impacts of energy production (Day, Gordon, Simcock 2016, Hillerbrand 2015), but more research is needed .

There are, of course, many other normative approaches that can be used for analysing issues of justice to future humans, but we do not have the space here for a more detailed discussion of their possible advantages and disadvantages. For the purpose of this article, it is enough to assume that the capabilities approach is one valuable approach and not necessarily preferable to all others (for a defence of capabilities as a unit for intergenerational distributive justice, see Page 2007A) .

It should be noted that the aim of the article is to contribute to the ethical debate on how concern for future humans should affect energy policy making. We do not aim to contribute to the natural scientific, technological or economic debate, although we make use of results from such studies .

We start by briefly describing the capabilities approach and how it can be applied to analysing issues of justice for future individuals. Thereafter, we analyse how the three energy scenarios should be assessed .

The capabilities approach and issues of justice for future humans
Capability is, of course, the key concept within the approach. It is defined in contrast to ‘functionings’, which refer to what people actually are or do, such as being workers or homemakers, or members of religious organizations. Functionings can be both complex and very elementary. Capability denotes the opportunity to choose a specific functioning. The emphasis on freedom of choice is connected with the fact that personal freedom concerning how one wants to live one’s life is regarded as a fundamental value within the capabilities approach. Consequently, the promotion of capabilities, rather than functioning, should be the goal of political decision making. For example, people should have the opportunity to have leisure time, but they should also be allowed to work sixteen hours a day if they so choose (Nussbaum 2013: 24-26, Nussbaum 2000: 87-88).

From the point of view of the capabilities approach, it can be argued that we should also consider the capabilities of future humans. The duties that we have to other individuals are derived from their capabilities, which in turn are derived from their human dignity. In contrast to contractarian theories, such as Rawls’s theory of justice, social cooperation within the same society is not a requirement for having duties to others. Nussbaum claims that we have duties to humans in all parts of the world, based on what they need to live a dignified human life. Therefore, the capabilities approach should be applied globally, not just nationally. All the citizens of the world should be assigned the same entitlements, and these form the basis for the correlative duties that others have. All humans have an obligation to promote a dignified life for everyone, not only for fellow nationals (Nussbaum 2006: 273-280). If cooperation is not a requirement for deriving duties to people in other parts of the world, it seems inconsistent to regard it as a requirement when considering whether we have any duty to people living in the future. In accordance with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, we also have reasons to assign to future humans certain entitlements that are necessary for living a dignified human life. The capabilities approach seems consistent with a principle of time neutrality, according to which we should not treat individuals differently just because of their position in time (Ekeli 2004: 429). Moreover, we should consider future humans in all parts of the world, since we cannot justify limiting our concern to current and future humans living in Sweden only.

When applying the capabilities approach to questions of energy justice for future humans, we first need to establish a list of capabilities in order to analyse how current and future humans are affected by the production and consumption of energy. Nussbaum has put forward the following list of capabilities, of which each individual should be guaranteed a threshold level: 1) life, 2) bodily health, 3) bodily integrity (mobility), 4) senses, imagination, and thought, 5) emotions, 6) practical reason, 7) affiliation, 8) other species, 9) play, 10) control over one’s environment, both political and material (Nussbaum 2000: 74-81, Nussbaum 2013: 33-34).

This extensive list seems relevant in an intragenerational context when comparing the impacts of a certain policy on different groups or individuals living now. However, when analysing the impacts on future humans, especially those living 50 years or more from now, we should acknowledge that the realization of capabilities by future humans is only partially dependent on the actions of current humans. Whether their capabilities are respected and promoted is to a large extent affected by the political decisions made during their lifetimes. For example, whether individuals born 50 years from now will realize the capability of senses, imagination or thought or not is only partly determined by decisions made by current humans. For example, if we emit a large amount of greenhouse gases so that individuals born in 50 years live in a world with a global mean temperature of 6℃ above the current mean, the frequency of drought and floods is likely to increase significantly. As a result, the increased temperature could lead to a notable decrease in human welfare and a weakening of social institutions, such as the educational system. However, the impact on the education of future humans is still only partly a consequence of the actions of current humans and is to a large extent influenced by future decisions.

The actions of current humans will impact the environmental goods of future individuals to a large extent but their personal and social goods to a lesser extent, since these goods are more strongly influenced by future decisions. When analysing the capability deprivations of future humans, it is necessary to distinguish between deprivations caused mainly by current humans and those caused mainly by future humans themselves. It is primarily the former that are of interest in the context of justice to future humans. For that reason, our analysis needs to focus on the capabilities connected with material well-being, as they are more directly related to environmental goods. Moreover, since being able to freely choose one’s life is central to Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, and since this capability is also greatly influenced by the actions of current humans, we include the capability of practical reason in our analysis. Thus, our list encompasses the following capabilities: 1) life, 2) bodily health, 3) practical reason, and 4) control over one’s material environment. The capability to live with other species will also be strongly affected by different energy scenarios. However,  we do not include it in our analysis, partly due to space limitations and partly since it is often argued that it is less important than many of the other capabilities (Okin 2003: 311).

with Nussbaum’s intention that the capabilities approach should be understood as a minimal theory of justice (Nussbaum 2000: 75). Concerning the capability of life, we consider the threshold to be a length of life that is considerably lower than the current global average. Regarding bodily health, individuals are considered to be situated below the threshold only if they suffer from serious diseases. As for the capability of practical reasons, individuals are considered to be below it only if they have considerably fewer opportunities to decide how to live their lives than the average individual in today’s democratic societies. Concerning the capability of control over one’s environment, people are considered to be below it if their property, including land, is in very poor condition.

In line with Nussbaum’s argumentation, a minimal requirement of justice is that current individuals should not cause or risk causing future individuals to be situated below the threshold value for any of the listed capabilities. However, since all energy scenarios risk leading to some significant negative impacts for future individuals, we have to make a choice between different scenarios that all entail a certain risk that individuals will be situated below the threshold at least for some of the capabilities on the list. The principle of sufficiency is central for the capability approach, but it can be interpreted in different ways. A moral radical interpretation of it would give sufficiency lexical priority over other principles. This means that increasing the number of individuals existing above the sufficiency threshold for all capabilities should be given priority over all other justice values, such as equality. For example, a situation A in which five individuals are far above the threshold levels for all capabilities and four individuals are very far below the threshold for all capabilities should be seen as preferable to a situation B in which four individuals are slightly above the threshold for all capabilities and five individuals are slightly below it for only one of the capabilities on the list.

However, as the previous example shows, giving lexical priority to sufficiency seems to have outcomes that clearly conflict with common moral intuitions. A moderate interpretation of the principle of sufficiency that recognizes that equality may also be important seems preferable (Page 2007B:15, Arneson 2006: 28). Our guiding principle is therefore that we should choose the scenario that leads to the largest number of future humans existing above the threshold for all the capabilities on the list. However, if a scenario X leads to a slightly larger number of future humans existing above the threshold for all the capabilities on the list than a scenario Y, at the same time as scenario X leads to much greater inequalities among future humans, then scenario Y should be chosen.