Examination paper for ENG 2452: Britain in Europe

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Examination date: 09.12.2014

Examination time (from-to): 9.00 – 13.00

Permitted examination support material:
Collins Cobuild Advanced Dictionary
(or earlier versions with the title: Collins Cobuild English (Advanced Learner's) Dictionary)

Language: English

Number of pages:

Number of pages enclosed:

Checked by:

________________________________________  ______________________________
Date                                      Signature
You MUST answer Sections A and B.

Section A amounts to 50% of your final grade. Section B amounts to 50% of your final grade.

You should divide your time accordingly.

You must achieve a pass grade (A-E) in both sections of the exam to achieve a pass grade overall.
Section A: Source Analysis

Answer BOTH questions 1 and 2 using the primary source extracts.

1. What does this source tell us about British enthusiasm for the development of a ‘third force’ and does it give us any indication of why the idea failed to materialize in the late 1940s?

‘By associating ourselves generally with the United States “Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment” of 6th December, 1945, and by our participation in the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment held in London from 15th October to 26th November, 1946, we have subscribed to a policy designed to bring about the maximum possible expansion of world trade, based upon high and sustained levels of employment and consumption in every country. This policy, if it can be achieved, is in the best interests of the United Kingdom as the world’s principal trading nation, and further would promote political stability in all parts of the world…We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the plans for an expansion of multilateral trade will break down. In the event we shall need to strengthen our economic ties, not merely with the Commonwealth, but also with Western Europe.

…We should be improvident if we were not prepared for the possibility that the Eastern half of Europe will continue to be excluded from the general free expansion of trade and that the U.S.S.R. will seek to extend its political and economic influence into Western Europe. Such an extension will be prevented only if we are prepared with measures which, involving close economic ties, would bind Western European countries politically more closely to ourselves.

…If we are to strengthen our ties with Western Europe we may be faced, therefore, with the necessity of taking a single plunge into a full customs union, which has always been exempted from the operation of the most-favoured-nation clause, and is expressly permitted under the United States proposal on commercial policy.

…It would be impossible, without extensive preliminary study to determine whether, in fact, on balance and in the circumstances envisaged, it would be economically of advantage to the United Kingdom. If not, the economic disadvantages would have to be weighed against the political advantages.

I accordingly invite my colleagues to sanction, without prejudice to any ultimate decision, the most complete possible study by the departments concerned of the practicability and desirability of:-

(i) A full customs union;

(ii) Some special economic regime, falling short of a full customs union, between
a. The United Kingdom and Metropolitan France;
b. The United Kingdom and the French Union;
c. The United Kingdom and Western Europe as a whole, including the Western Zones of Germany, as occasion offered.

An extract from:
Ernest Bevin (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), ‘Proposal for a study of the possibilities of close economic co-operation with our Western European neighbours’, British Cabinet Memorandum, 18 January 1947.

2. How accurate is Nigel Lawson’s account of Margaret Thatcher’s negotiation of the Single European Act and were the terms of the Act really as dangerous as he suggests?

‘Since I was not to be present at the Luxembourg Council, and the Foreign Office would inevitably be soft on the issue, I minuted Margaret again on Thursday, 28 November 1985, just ahead of the Council which was due to start on the following Monday:

Your line might be:

“There should be no reference in the Treaty to EMU, since this – which implies progress towards a common currency and a common Central Bank – would be no more credible to outside opinion than the commitments entered into in 1971 and 1972, and is in any case politically unacceptable to the UK.”

In the event, she was able, with German support, to get the Treaty reference to EMU watered down, but not removed altogether; and, preferring the on-the-spot advice of the Foreign Office, who told her that what remained was little more than hot air, to the counsel I had proffered in advance, she signed up. The great prize was allegedly the target of completing the single market by the end of 1992 and the facilitation of this by a large scale move from unanimity to majority voting. I was skeptical about the wisdom of the deal she had struck. I felt that we had embarked upon a dangerous slippery slope towards EMU; whereas the move to majority voting, which had been strongly urged by [Jacques] Delors [French Socialist and President of the European Commission, 1984-94] as essential if Europe was to regain the momentum it had latterly lost, would have been agreed even without EMU.’

An extract from:
Section B: Essay

Answer ONE of the following questions.

1. Why did Harold Macmillan decide to apply for British membership of the EEC in 1961 and how significant was France’s decision to veto British membership?

2. Which Conservative Prime Minister has the strongest record on European integration, Edward Heath, Margaret Thatcher, or John Major?

3. Has the Labour Party or the Conservative Party been most divided by European issues since 1970?