

Examinator's Guidance POL2013, Spring 2020

BOKMÅL

Svar på både (A) og (B) (mellom 3000 og 5000 ord, ekskl. litteraturliste).

(A)

- Drøft påstanden om at fredsoppgjøret etter de franske revolusjonskrigene/Napoleonskrigene munnet ut i en verdensorden (eller europeisk orden) som i betydelig grad var påvirket av «westfaliske» prinsipper.
- I hvilken grad klarte denne ordenen å etablere en balanse mellom makt og legitimitet?

(B)

- Drøft påstanden om at verdenen etter den kalde krigen har vært, og er, sterkt formet av amerikanske oppfatninger av ordenen.
- Hvilke hovedtrusler og -utfordringer står denne ordenen overfor i dag? Er disse unike, eller minner de om trusler/utfordringer som har møtt ordener i tidligere tidsepoker?
- Til sist: Drøft påstanden om at vi er på vei mot en mer «westfalisk» verdensorden.

Foreta en selvstendig analyse av disse temaene, men pass på at analysen er forankret i relevante deler av kurslitteraturen.

NYNORSK

Svar på både (A) og (B) (mellom 3000 og 5000 ord, ekskl. litteraturliste).

(A)

- Drøft påstanden om at fredsoppgjøret etter dei franske revolusjonskrigane/Napoleonskrigane munna ut i ein verdsorden (eller europeisk orden) som i betydeleg grad var påverka av «westfaliske» prinsipp.
- I kva grad klarte denne ordenen å etablere ein balanse mellom makt og legitimitet?

(B)

- Drøft påstanden om at verda etter den kalde krigen har vore, og er, sterkt forma av amerikanske oppfatningar av ordenen.
- Kva for hovudtruslar og -utfordringar står denne ordenen overfor i dag? Er desse unike, eller minner dei om truslar/utfordringar som har møtt ordenar i tidligera tidsepokar?

- Til sist: Drøft påstanden om at vi er på veg mot ein meir «westfalisk» verdsorden.

Gjer ein sjølvstendig analyse av desse temaa, men pass på at analysen er forankra i relevante delar av kurslitteraturen.

ENGLISH

Answer both (A) and (B) (between 3000 and 5000 words, excl. list of references).

(A)

- Discuss the claim that the peace settlement following the French Revolutionary Wars/Napoleonic Wars spurred a world (or European) order that was significantly influenced by “Westphalian” principles.
- To what extent did this order manage to establish a balance between power and legitimacy?

(B)

- Discuss the claim that the post-Cold War world has been, and is, strongly shaped by American perceptions of order.
- What main threats and challenges is this order facing today? Are these unique, or do they resemble threats/challenges that orders of previous epochs have faced?
- Lastly: Discuss the claim that we are about to enter into a more “Westphalian” world order.

Perform an independently-crafted analysis of these issues, but make sure that you anchor your analysis in relevant parts of the course literature.

The home exam, which has to be between 3000 and 5000 words, should be an independently-crafted analysis, but one that is firmly based in the course’s core readings. In particular, students must actively engage Henry Kissinger’s (2015) *World Order* – its main arguments and the chapters that pertain particularly to the tasks at hand. Students who fail to exhibit a sufficient understanding of that book, and especially students who have not read it, cannot obtain any of the top grades, *irrespective of the general quality of the analysis*.

Students should also draw on some of the rest of the required readings, where appropriate. These include, inter alia:

- Borghard, Erica D. and Shawn W. Lonergan (2017). "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace." *Security Studies*.
- Chong, Ja Ian and Todd H. Hall (2014). "The Lessons of 1914 for East Asia Today: Missing the Trees for the Forest." *International Security*.
- Flockhart, Trine (2016). "The Coming Multi-Order World." *Contemporary Security Policy*.
- Gaddis, John Lewis (1997). *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Ch. 1: "Dividing the World." Ch. 2: "Cold War Empires: Europe."
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter (ed.) (2013). "The Forum: The Decline of War." *International Studies Review*.
- Ikenberry, G. John (2018). "The End of Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs*.
- Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth (2009). "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences." *World Politics*.
- Jakobsen, Jo, Tor G. Jakobsen and Eirin Rande Ekevold (2016). "Democratic Peace and the Norms of the Public: A Multilevel Analysis of the Relationship between Regime Type and Citizens' Bellicosity, 1981–2008." *Review of International Studies*.
- Joll, James and Gordon Martel (2007[1984]). *The Origins of the First World War* (3rd. ed.). Ch. 3: "The Alliance System and the Old Diplomacy."
- Mandelbaum, Michael (2019). "Is Major War Still Obsolete?" *Survival*.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Ch. 2. "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power."
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (2006 [1948]). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (7th ed.; revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton). Ch. 1: "A Realist Theory of International Politics." Ch. 2: "The Science of International Politics."
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. and David A. Welch (2013). *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History*. Ch. 4: "The Failure of Collective Security and World War II.;" Ch. 8: "The Information Revolution and Transnational Actors."
- Pettersson, Therése, Stina Högladh and Magnus Öberg (2019). "Organized Violence, 1989–2018, and Peace Agreements." *Journal of Peace Research*.

Of course, given the nature of the task, students are granted a fair bit of leeway with regard to the arguments put forth, the paper's theoretical basis, and its conclusions. Generally speaking, grades are determined by the candidate's knowledge, skills, and

control. A text is regarded as good insofar as the candidate demonstrates solid knowledge of the topic, a good overview of sources, and the ability to apply relevant concepts and theoretical viewpoints independently and thoughtfully.

Furthermore, a good text should start by interpreting and delimiting the task, and it should also point to which analytical tools are of relevance; a good text should define the most important concepts, and it should clearly present the approaches taken. Good texts will also demonstrate solid control of the course's core readings – of the theories, concepts, and facts presented there. Of course, texts that draw on additional, relevant literature should be rewarded for doing so. In addition, good texts are characterized by their ability to *apply* the theories and concepts in a focused and consistent manner. Good texts should construct a logical reasoning, and relevant empirics should be used to support the arguments. Contrarily, weaker texts tend to decouple definitions and empirics, and theories/concepts and discussion. They also tend to *describe* rather than *analyze*, often focusing too much on details rather than identifying the essentials of the matter.

We can thus expect of good and very good texts that:

- they exhibit a considerable degree of independence and reflection
- they lead to clear (and independently-crafted) conclusions
- they are analytical rather than descriptive
- they show a solid understanding of theoretical arguments
- they have a high level of precision in the argumentation and in their references to theory and empirics
- they have a solid grasp of vital developments in international politics in the time periods of relevance
- they demonstrate deep and broad knowledge and understanding of the course's required readings
- they resemble the *form* of academic papers

A home exam of this type necessarily leads to a substantial variation in the texts that students produce, with regard to structure, argumentation, delimitation of time periods (e.g. the post-Vienna Congress period), conclusions, and the like. Needless to say, there are no clear template identifying “wrong” and “right” answers.

But Kissinger's reflections constitute the natural point of departure, and students must show that they understand his core arguments. At first glance, his conception of order is simple: it has to do with the *balance between legitimacy and power*. Kissinger writes:

World order describes the concept held by a region or civilization about the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be applicable to the entire world. An international order is the practical application of these concepts to a substantial part of the globe – large enough to affect the global balance of power. Regional orders involve the same principles applied to a defined geographic area. Any one of these systems of order bases itself on two components: a set of commonly accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down, preventing one political unit from subjugating all others.

Order is thus, simply stated, (balance of) power plus legitimacy (are the prevailing arrangements seen as just, in particular by the most prominent states and actors?).

When writing about the era following the French Revolutionary Wars one needs to engage with the first two chapters of Kissinger's book. Of course, the general concepts of world order were spelled out as early as in the Westphalia Peace Conferences following the Thirty Years' War. They stressed, *inter alia*, the equality of sovereign states; the state's role as the building bloc of world (European) order; multiplicity (of internal arrangements); and the importance of a balance of power to preserve this order. These principles are still something akin to a lowest common denominator for how we conceive the order concept today, and such a "Westphalian" system remains, in Kissinger's words, "the scaffolding of international order such as it now exists."

Westphalia also formed the point of departure for the order that was formalized and symbolized by the 1814–1815 Congress of Vienna. There, the concept of a European balance of power was particularly emphasized; notably, France was soon reintegrated into the order considering that it was key for this balance to work. Both Vienna and the more general "Congress System" that was established in its wake established a general framework for a Europe-wide governance or order whereby interstate differences would be settled by consultations among the great powers rather than by war. Different kinds of more or less formal alliances were also created among the great powers – the Quadruple Alliance, the Holy Alliance, and the Concert of Powers; each of these had its own unique objectives, but in general they were quasi-institutional mechanisms established to ease coordination efforts in order to avoid another great-power war; uphold the "Westphalian" state system; uphold a balance of power; counter liberal and nationalist revolutions; and settle minor and major territorial differences among European states. One can easily argue, as Kissinger does, that this

system helped strike a useful balance between legitimacy and power (no major power challenged its main provisions in the first decades, and these same powers often intervened by agreement to uphold the system).

Task (B) centers on the current (i.e. the post-Cold War) order – and in part on the future one. The question of the U.S.'s role in shaping this order is not necessarily straightforward. However, students could trace some of the roots back to the post-WWII period and the Cold War (which is covered by Ikenberry and Gaddis), while naturally also highlighting the fairly dramatic shift in the balancing power that took place when the Soviet Union collapsed (Ikenberry et al. focus specifically on the effects of unipolarity, indirectly effects on order). Some students, though, might focus less on the U.S. and its understandings of order than on the characteristics of this order themselves (e.g. “globalization” or interdependence, prevailing international norms, international institutions, technological changes, the spread of democracy). Others would emphasize more clearly U.S. thinking, which, it is fair to say, has vacillated greatly between Westphalian, *realpolitik* notions and more idealistic, “Wilsonian” ideas. If we, for example, compare this current order to the post-Vienna one, it is perhaps fair to say that the latter was significantly less informed by ideological objectives (although counterrevolutionary interventions were surely also motivated by conservative “ideologies”). The United States, some would say, has drawn, and is still drawing significantly from President Wilson’s interwar ideas (covered, for example, by Kissinger and by Nye & Welch, Ch. 4); national self-determination, the spread of democracy, human rights principles, free trade, and collective security (in the form of NATO?) are ideas that represent a clear continuity in America’s conception of order. On the other hand, such ideas are (often, by no means always) promoted by Washington within what may still be interpreted as a generally Westphalian system. Stability and non-intervention, and state sovereignty, are often highlighted as vital issues – but so are their more Wilsonian counterparts, and the United States often seems consistently ambivalent on the issue of realism vs. idealism. As Kissinger says: “No country has played such a decisive role in shaping contemporary world order as the United States, nor professed such ambivalence about participation in it.”

Task (B) must necessarily result in fairly independent analyses; and as long as the analysis is plausible (and usefully connected to the literature and to empirics or “facts”), students should be rewarded for originality and independence. This is also true, of course, for the sub-task that revolve around the question of *threats* to this order. This is not straightforward either. Some would highlight in particular the rise of populist-

nationalism and developments internal to the U.S. (e.g. Donald Trump). Others would point to the power element of the order equation, arguing that the shifts in the balance of power – the resurgence of Russia, the massive growth of China, and the concomitant relative decline(?) of the United States – as the main driving force behind the purported order challenge. One may also argue – and Chapters 3–6 of Kissinger’s book deal with this – that potential challengers are inclined to question the legitimacy of America’s order. Insofar as we can pinpoint a Chinese conception of order, it involves perhaps a mixture of historically-rooted notions about the virtues of interstate hierarchy (as opposed to an anarchic Westphalian world) and more traditional Westphalian ideas, which China has clearly adopted as well. In fact, the challenge stemming from China and Russia in many ways involves a drive to create a more *pure* version of Westphalia than what is currently characterizing the world order. And, of course, one additional important challenge is the one stemming from parts of Islamic ideology: although opinions on the matter vary (for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran espouse fairly fundamentalist perceptions of order, but both are still apt to follow the “rules of the international game”), some versions of Islamic thinking is incompatible with the principles underlying the current world order, with the Islamic State’s version being the most dramatic, recent example of this.

As for comparisons with threats and challenges faced by previous orders, students’ leeway are greater still; again the trick us to construct a logical case for the argument(s), whether one’s basis for comparison constitutes, say, balance-of-power changes (e.g. the 1871 unification of Germany, or the Cold War superpower rivalry after the end of multipolarity), the spread of nationalism (symbolized by 1848), technological innovation (e.g. pre-WWI), or revisionism (interwar period).

The last task essentially concerns prediction of the (near) future. A thankless task perhaps, but in some respect easier given that students cannot be proven either right or wrong(!). Again: A sound logic should be created, based on the readings (Flockhart and Kissinger, in his final chapter, deal specifically with this), but still independently-crafted. The point of this last exercise is *not* to indicate that we’re necessarily about to return to Westphalia; it is rather to create an opening for students to criticize such a presumption (Flockhart, for example, is not explicitly focused on such a scenario) – or to agree with it, of one wants.