Question 1: Identifications

Answer two only (each is worth 25 %). Based upon class readings and lectures, explain the significance of two of the following.

1. APEC

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, often described as four adjectives in search of a noun, APEC was established in 1989 at the initiative of Australia, but with significant behind the scenes support and encouragement from Japan. APEC is arguably the clearest embodiment of an Asia-Pacific definition of the region, i.e. a region that includes East Asia, Oceania, and the west coast of the Americas, versus an East Asian definition of the region. APEC was formed with twelve nations: the (then) six ASEAN countries, plus Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and the United States. In 1991 it was announced that China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan would join. In 1993, Chile, Mexico and Papua New Guinea were added. In 1998, Peru, Vietnam and Russia were added. APEC also embraces open, not closed economic regionalism, and has tended to see its role as supporting global trade talks through GATT and more recently through the WTO. APEC is not a rule-making or trade-negotiating body like WTO, but a consultative forum. It may have trade- and investment-liberalizing impact through procedures through which members volunteer to liberalize sectors of their economy of their own choosing. APEC has a bias toward consensus-based decision-making. (Borthwick, Pacific Century 545)

APEC represents a clear contrast to the relatively closed and East Asia centric East Asian Economic Caucus, or EAEC, proposed by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia at the beginning of the 1990s, even though EAEC, like APEC, was at least in part a regional response to fears of closed trade blocks emerging in Europe through the Maastricht treaty and the North American Free Trade Area, or NAFTA. Nonetheless, given the strong interest in global free trade on the part of Japan and East Asia’s other export oriented economies, APEC was embraced while the EAEC was rejected. While APEC was originally organized around trade and foreign ministers’ meetings, in 1993 on the initiative of President Clinton an annual APEC summit was established.

2. Chiang Kai-shek

The second significant leader of the Kuomintang (KMT), or Chinese Nationalist Party, after its founder, Sun Yat-sen passed away. Chiang received military training in the Soviet Union and Japan and later headed the Whampoa Military Academy, training the KMT’s military. He led the KMT campaign that more or less unified China in the late 1920s defeating, in some cases absorbing, thousands of warlords in the process. Despite allying with the Soviet Union and using the Soviet Communist Party as a model for reorganizing the KMT, Chiang turned against his Chinese Communist Party allies, massacring thousands during the white terror of 1927. Chiang continued to pursue the remnants of the Chinese Communist Party, reorganizing under Mao Tse-tung, until Japan invaded China proper in 1937. Fighting Japan as one of the Allies during World War II, he returned to his earlier goal of defeating the Chinese Communists after 1945. Defeated by Mao’s communists by 1949, he and the remnants of the KMT fled to Taiwan, where Chiang ruled as a martial-law dictator till his
death in the mid-1970s. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo continued to rule Taiwan until the late 1980s.

During the struggle with the Communists from 1921 to 1949, Chiang Kai-shek tried to establish legitimacy for the Nationalists with a program aiming for national unification, moral rejuvenation and abolition of unequal treaties. His government renegotiated treaties to end extraterritoriality during World War II. The program aimed at recovering lost territories, at a minimum, Hong Kong, Macao, Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria and Taiwan. His government was compelled to accept demands, based on the February 1945 Yalta Agreement, to grant independence to Outer Mongolia and special rights in Manchuria to the Soviet Union. This caused great frustration in China.

3. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute

The Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands (these names are used in Japan and China, respectively), are a group of eight uninhabited islets that lie about 200 km. northeast of Taiwan, 300 km. west of Okinawa (Japan) and 300 km. east of the Chinese mainland. These governments’ interest in these islands increased when a UN survey found petroleum deposits in the area in 1968. However, it is not probable that there are commercially viable fields in the area. The islands also occupy an important strategic location.

Until the end of the 1800s, uninhabited islands in East Asia such as these were generally not contested. Japan claims the islands on the basis that they were uninhabited when Japan formally incorporated them into its territory in 1895 and that it maintains effective control over them. China claims the islands on the basis that it has a history of contact with them that goes far back, furthermore, it claims that it did not have the capacity to react to Japan’s annexation of them because it was preoccupied with responding to imperialist encroachment at the time. Taiwan also claims the islands. The US occupied the islands after World War II and transferred administrative control over them to Japan together with Okinawa in 1971.

In the 1970s, Japan and China agreed to ‘shelve’ the issue of sovereignty over the islands as they normalized diplomatic relations and negotiated a peace treaty. In 1978, Japanese rightists built a lighthouse on one of the islands. The same year, right-wing LDP Diet members tried to condition the inclusion of an ‘anti-hegemony’ clause in the Peace and Friendship Treaty with China on China’s acceptace that Japan had sovereignty over the islands. China reacted to this demand by sending 100 armed fishing boats into the territorial waters surrounding the islands. Subsequently, the Japan Coast Guard has maintained effective control over the islands by fending off intruders from Hong Kong, Taiwan and other countries.

In 1992, Beijing passed a Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which designated the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands as Chinese. In 1996, Japanese rightists again built a lighthouse on one of the islands. Tension between Japan and China involving fishing and other competing territorial claims again arose.

Subsequently, periodic tensions involving fishing and other intrusions, surveillance by government ships and aircraft, and diplomatic protests alternated with times of relaxation of tensions. In September 2010, the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler, which was fishing inside the territorial waters of the islands, refused inspection by the Japan Coast Guard and instead rammed his vessel into the Japanese ships. The Japanese authorities arrested him, and this led to a two week long diplomatic standoff between Japan and China, until he was released and flown home to China.

In September 2012, the Government of Japan purchased three of the islands from its private owner. This was done to forestall them being bought and developed in ways that could
provoke China by Tokyo Governor Ishihara. Nevertheless, protesting against the purchase, which in a sense was a Japanese ‘nationalization’ of the islands, China immediately sent fishing vessels into the territorial waters around them, and continued to do so for several months. For some time, some of China’s top leaders would not have official meetings with their Japanese counterparts.

4. unequal treaties

Unequal treaties were treaties signed between an East Asian state and an imperialist state, which often threatened to use military force, in the nineteenth century. The treaties were unequal in that the imperialist side did not have to accept the conditions that the East Asian state had to. The unequal treaties often included three elements: forced opening of treaty ports, imposition of foreign extraterritoriality over their own citizens living in the East Asian country and the loss of tariff autonomy. The Treaty of Nanjing between China and Britain of 1842, which ended the First Opium War, is often considered the first unequal treaty. Five Chinese ports were opened to unrestricted foreign trade: Shanghai, Ningbo, Guangzhou Xiamen and Fuzhou. Britain was granted extraterritoriality over their own citizens, who would be judged by British consuls for crimes committed in China. Tariffs were fixed and agreed upon by China and Britain. In addition, Hong Kong island was ceded to Britian as a colony (1842-1997) and China was forced to pay an indemnity.

Following the Second Opium War, Britain and France signed the Treaty of Tianjin with China in 1858, which included the following provisions: the establishment of permanent Western legations in Beijing, the opening of ten new ports, the permission of foreign travel to all parts of China, the imposition of an upper limit on inland transit dues for foreign imports at 2.5 % of the value of the goods, the payment of an indemnity of six million taels and the guarantee of freedom of movement throughout China for missionaries. (Borthwick Pacific Century, 99) A controversy over British and French passage to Beijing in order to exchange treaty ratifications touched off skirmishes. The British and French returned with stronger forces in 1860, and China was forced to accept stricter conditions.

The Harris Treaty between the US and Japan, from 1858, had the same elements: it opened 5 ports not already opened to US trade (Yokohama, Nagasaki, Niigata, Hyôgo and Osaka), exempted US citizens living in these ports from the jurisdiction of Japanese law, and arranged for diplomatic representation and a tariff agreement between the US and Japan.

The 1876 Kanghwa Treaty between Japan and Korea is an example of an unequal treaty imposed by an Asian imperialist state (Japan). It ended Korea's status as a tributary state of China and opened three ports to Japanese trade (Busan, Incheon and Wonsan). It exempted Japanese goods imported to Korea from customs duties and provided extraterritoriality to Japanese in Korea.

In July 1928, the US and the Chinese Kuomintang Government concluded treaties returning tariff autonomy to China on US goods. In January 1929, all major powers returned tariff autonomy to China. Lenin strengthened Soviet prestige by offering to give up nearly all of the old claims and privileges of the czars. However, he wished to retain the Chinese Eastern Railway in North Manchuria, the most valuable possession, and this caused discord with China. At this time, several small European powers surrendered extraterritoriality, but the US, UK and Japan refused to do so. Most of China’s unequal treaties were abrogated during the Sino-Japanese War which began in 1937 or during World War II, which followed.

After 1858, revising the unequal treaties dominated Japanese relations with the West. Western nations demanded extraterritoriality as long as they considered the Japanese political and legal system inferior. This motivated Japanese reformers to adopt a constitution that provided for a Diet and to introduce a Western legal system. In treaties with a series of
countries in 1911, remnants of extraterritoriality were abolished and Japan achieved tariff
autonomy.

When Japan annexed Korea in 1910, Korean independence, which was a provision of the
unequal Kanghwa treaty, was no longer a reality.

Candidates may also describe how East Asians interpreted the unequal treaties in light of the
Sino-Centric tributary system and compare the treaties with this system.

**Question 2: Essay**

*Answer only 1 question based upon class readings and lectures. This answer is worth
50%.*

1. **North Korea has tested several nuclear weapons and missiles in recent years. What**
   **North Korean goals do you think were behind these actions? How do you think that**
   **the largest countries in, and other countries with influence on, East Asia, view these**
   **actions? Give reasons for your answer by referring to the policies that these countries**
   **have followed in the past. Discuss how much influence these countries have over**
   **North Korea. Based on your answers, do you think that it is likely or unlikely that**
   **North Korea will continue its nuclear weapon and missile development?**

As Dr. Hiim explained in the guest lecture on the course, the reason that North Korea has
been testing nuclear weapons and missiles in recent years is probably that it wants to
develop a nuclear deterrent. Recent tests have probably been conducted with the aim of
developing an operational capacity. The wish to have a nuclear deterrent seems to come
from insecurity experienced by North Korea for a long time. The country made some
investments in nuclear technology as early as 1956, and it did not trust Soviet and Chinese
extended deterrence during the Cold War. Furthermore, South Korea’s program to develop
nuclear weapons in the 1970s may have posed a threat to North Korea.

Here, the views of North Korea’s actions held by China, Japan and the United States will be
examined. The first two countries are, by some measures, the largest countries in East Asia,
and the US is arguably the country outside East Asia with the greatest influence on the
region.

As Dr. Hiim argued, China has a negative view of North Korea’s development of nuclear
weapons.

- Despite using a rhetoric of supporting nuclear proliferation to Socialist states in the past,
  Pakistan was the only case of actual Chinese proliferation between the 1950s and 1970s.
  China turned down requests from North Korea to help them build a nuclear bomb three times
  in the 1960s and -70s. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is giving Japan and
  South Korea reasons to strengthen their military capabilities and missile defense and is
  leading to tighter alliances with the US, all of which are negative for China.

- However, China weighs its opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program against a wish to
  sustain the regime, because regime collapse would lead to regional instability and a united
  Korea that is allied with the US would pose a security threat to China. Since the early 1990s,
  China has therefore followed a policy of sheltering North Korea. Sheltering is a policy of
  economic or military protection of a state with a controversial nuclear program.

- In 1993, North Korea declared that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation
  Treaty, after it was discovered that it was diverting plutonium, which could be used in nuclear
weapons, from its nuclear reactor. In the crisis that followed, China insisted that North Korea negotiate directly with the IAEA and the US. While not being averse to sanctions against North Korea, China worked to prevent sanctions and pressure on North Korea. This was the essence of its sheltering policy.

- The first nuclear crisis was resolved when the US and North Korea reached a deal called the “Agreed Framework,” under which North Korea agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear reactors in exchange for supply of heavy fuel oil from the US, US help to build proliferation resistant reactors in North Korea, and eventually normalizing diplomatic relations with the US.

- The US did not fully keep their part of the Agreed Framework deal, partly because Republicans in Congress were against it. It was also discovered in 2002 that North Korea had a uranium enrichment program in place, and the Agreed Framework deal then broke down. The US stopped all oil deliveries and North Korea expelled inspectors from the IAEA and withdrew from the NPT – this time finally. Following this second crisis, China took a more active role by hosting the six-party talks between China, the US, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea, which started in 2003. A temporary breakthrough in these negotiations was reached in 2005, when North Korea agreed to get rid of all nuclear weapons, and the US agreed to provide security guarantees. However, after North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, the six-party talks were discontinued (Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, 198). After this test, China was, for the first time, willing to sanction North Korea.

China thus views the North Korean nuclear weapons and missile tests as having negative consequences. China’s policy of sheltering aims to maintain the North Korean regime, but is not a way to support its nuclear program.

The relationship between Japan and North Korea is, however, more hostile, and Japan sees the North Korean nuclear weapons and missile development as a threat to Japan. Many argue that during the Cold War, Japan followed a grand strategy that corresponds to the Yoshida Doctrine, which has been summarized in three tenets by Kenneth Pyle (The Making of Modern Japan),

1. Japan’s economic stability must be the prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the United States was necessary for this purpose.
2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues.
3. To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the US Army, Navy and Air Force.

Japan has entered into an alliance with the US which contains a formal, explicit guarantee that the US would defend Japan against an attack. However, Japan does not have joint command of its armed forces with the US in wartime. After the Cold War, Japan has prepared its forces for rear area support of US operations in East Asia. The April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration stated that the US and Japan should revise their Defense Guidelines so that they also applied to areas around Japan. Furthermore, beginning in 2001, Japan dispatched MSDF ships to the Indian Ocean to resupply US forces involved in military operations in Afghanistan.

A North Korean test of a missile in August 1998, which flew over Japanese territory, became a major cause of Japan’s decision to procure spy satellites and provoked an important change in Japanese perceptions of security. Japan later acquired ship based “Standard Missile” and land-based “Patriot” missile defense.

Japan thus viewed North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile tests as threats that it dealt with by defensive military measures, support for responses of the US and diplomatic means.
The US is concerned that North Korea, with its nuclear missiles, can threaten the US allies South Korea and Japan, US bases in Guam and possibly even the US mainland. As Dr. Hiim explained, proliferation is a key interest for the US. It became even more important after the end of the Cold War and with 9/11.

After the end of the Cold War, US President George H.W. Bush reduced the number of US troops in South Korea by about 5000 to about 37 000. The US has since maintained forces of up to this number in that country. The US reduced its number of tactical nuclear weapons worldwide. This included withdrawal of such weapons from South Korea and surface ships in the Pacific. The US also has forces in Japan. The March 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrated that the US was willing to get involved in conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. The US sent two carrier battle groups to waters off the eastern shore of Taiwan on that occasion.

The evidence thus indicates that the US has viewed North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile development as a threat. This threat has been considered large enough to justify maintaining US military strength, support for allies and diplomatic efforts in East Asia. Examples of diplomatic efforts are the Agreed Framework deal and the six-party talks.

Analysis of influence over North Korea can proceed by describing the power resources that these countries have. It can also proceed by describing how countries can use these power resources to wield influence over North Korea.

China has nuclear weapons and missile technology, although it has not shared it with North Korea, although North Korea has smuggled such technologies out of China on some occasions. China also has a lot of economic goods that North Korea wants. China also has the power to veto decisions in the UN Security Council. The danger that the North Korean regime will collapse is a source of North Korean influence over China.

Japan is in conflict with North Korea. However, the ability of Japan to conduct offensive military operations against North Korea is quite limited (for example, Japan does not have missiles that can be used to attack sites in North Korea.) Through an active diplomacy in fora such as the UN, Japan has worked to introduce sanctions against North Korea.

The US has military and economic resources, has bases in allied countries close to North Korea and uses diplomacy in fora such as the UN to promote sanctions against North Korea. However, the more operational North Korea’s nuclear weapons become, the more it will be able to deter US actions.

Many different conclusions about the likelihood of North Korea continuing its nuclear weapon and missile development can be drawn. A good assessment will build on correct and relevant facts presented in the other parts of the answer to the question / information from course readings and lectures.

2. Describe the role that historical memory plays in Sino-Japanese relations. Explain how and why conflicts about history have had significance for the relation between these two nations. Evaluate the degree of reflection on this past history in these two nations.

Describe the role that historical memory plays in Sino-Japanese relations.
The focus in these relations is most often on contrasting Chinese and Japanese memories of Japan’s invasion and colonization of China. One topic is the question of whether, and if so, how, Japan should apologize for its past wars and imperialism. This became a central political issue at the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995. Another topic is disagreement between China and Japan about the facts of the 1937 Nanjing massacre. A third topic concerns how accurately Japan teaches its youth about Japanese expansionism 1875-1945. The issue first emerged in 1982, and reemerged in 1986, 2001 and 2005. A fourth topic is the handling of Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese who have died in wars for the Emperor are commemorated. One issue with the shrine is that it has a museum that presents a revisionist view of history. Other issues are: Should Japan build a non-religious memorial site? Should Japanese prime ministers cease to visit the shrine in order not to provoke China and other countries?

Explain how conflicts about history have had significance for the relation between these two nations.

It seems that Japan and China are influenced by identities created by historical memory. One example is the May 4th movement of 1919, which was demonstrations against acquisitions awarded to Japan at the Versailles conference. Furthermore, Chinese see the Japanese invasion of China during the 1930s as the culmination of the century of humiliation. Having such an identity, in 1985 and 1986, student demonstrators condemned the flood of Japanese goods into China as a second invasion. (Garver, ‘Legacy of the Past,’ 22-23) The May 4th movement was echoed in anti-Japanese demonstration in China in 2005. However, Japanese memories of World War II often focus on the atomic bombings and fire bombings that Japan was subjected to, and have created a victim identity in Japan. Japan has apologized for its past wars and colonization in many ways, perhaps most forthrightly by the Socialist Prime Minister Murayama on the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995. However, a much milder resolution that was passed by the Japanese Diet earlier the same year, which also condemned World War II related aggression was met with severe criticism in Japan for admitting too much guilt. (Berger, ‘Construction of Antagonism,’ 80)

Explain why conflicts about history have had significance for the relation between these two nations.

A series of events converged to make historical memory into a focus of attention around when the Cold War ended. During the Cold War, the US was willing to subordinate justice and international reconciliation to the larger goal of defending against Communism. (Berger, ‘Construction of Antagonism’) A consequence of the hubs and spokes arrangement of US alliances was to inhibit dialogue between different US allies. (Berger, ‘Construction of Antagonism,’ 68).

At the same time, the Chinese were not concerned with the Anti-Japanese War during the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, it might have seemed highly inconsequential for Japan to pursue a dialogue on past injustices with regimes like those of China under Mao Zedong at a time when this government was engaged in the brutal repression of its political opponents. In addition, it was possible for authoritarian regimes to repress any grassroot anti-Japanese sentiments that may have been present, and such sentiments may therefore have been concealed. (Berger, ‘Construction of Antagonism,’ 69)

Several changes in Japan around 1990 led to a greater focus on wartime historical memories. During the 1980s, increased intra-regional economic interdependence and intensified regional political dialogue had put the history issue on the international political
agenda. Later, China and Korea criticized Japanese attitudes toward the past in the ARF (Berger, ‘Construction of Antagonism,’ 78).

Only in the 1990s, and after the death of Hirohito, the (albeit temporary) collapse of LDP dominance, and the exertion of enormous pressure from progressives at home and abroad, did the Japanese Ministry of Education begin to introduce even tepid accounts of Japanese atrocities in history textbooks. (Benfell, ‘Why Can’t Japan Apologize?’) Furthermore, the generation that had been directly involved in the war and Japan’s colonial domination of Asia, and those outside of Japan who had personally suffered at the hands of the Japanese had passed from the scene. This led to a greater willingness to look again at the past. (Berger ‘Construction of Antagonism,’ 77-78)

China’s experience of a century of humiliation has created an identity which led to great support for the anti-imperialist policy of post-1949 China. (Garver, ‘Legacy of the Past,’ 7-8) China may also use confrontations with foreign governments to rouse emotional nationalist reactions. This may have been the case when Beijing condemned the 1982 move by Japan’s Ministry of Education to revise the school textbook interpretation of Japan’s aggression in China in the 1930s. (Garver, ‘Legacy of the Past,’ 28) Furthermore, when examining animosity between groups, one should be aware of two possibilities: 1) Intergroup animosity develops at the mass societal level and bubbles up to create conflict or 2) animosities are deliberately created by elites, often for instrumental purposes (Berger, ‘Construction of Antagonism’).

When the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin visited Japan in 1998, he was unwilling to commit himself to a final resolution of the history issue. Chinese military buildup, in contrast to that of Japan, made Chinese demands for a Japanese apology seem a bit rich to the Japanese. Hence, Japan did not make a full apology during Jiang’s visit. In general, tensions over Taiwan and Japan’s security relation with the US color its relationship with China (Berger ‘Construction of Antagonism,’ 81).

Evaluate the degree of reflection on this past history in these two nations.

This can be done in many ways. One approach is to consider whether attitudes agree with the apologist, the reconciliation first, or the historical reassurance approaches, which were presented in a course lecture. According to the apologist approach, apologizing is a prerequisite for achieving reconciliation with a neighboring country that a country has invaded. The reconciliation first school argues that Japan should be careful about making frequent, strong, and unconditional apologies for its past actions, and instead focus on the prerequisites of historical reconciliation such as to avoid justifying or celebrating past aggression. The historical reassurance school emphasizes the importance of other forms of reassurance, such as adopting public school textbooks and curricula that teach a denationalized and honest history, and domestic places of worship that effectively do the same, thereby sending a form of costly and reassuring signal.

One can also consider the degree of reflection on past history by assessing whether people are concerned that those who gain power in the nation have the moral superiority that they should have, which reflects a representative attitude to history in China (Garver, ‘Legacy of the Past,’ 4).

In addition, one can assess the prevalence of right-wing revisionist, progressive and renegade interpretations of history in Japan and the degree of reflection that each of them builds on (Benfell, ‘Why Can’t Japan Apologize?’).