Bailey organized the course around the concept of levels of analysis, or as Kenneth Waltz has termed them, the three “images”. The three levels/images are 1) the individual level; 2) the state; and 3) the international system. Explanations that depend on “human nature” and characteristics of individual leaders belong at the first level; explanations that have to do with national characteristics, structure, institutions and ideologies/mindsets belong at the second level, and systemic explanations belong at the third level. In addition, the Schmidt article uses a similar approach but without using this terminology – he writes about systemic and “internal, domestic” explanations, and mentions “personalities of individuals”. Systemic level explanations are those that are explicitly international relations theories, especially realism (Schmidt covers offensive and defensive realism, the lecture covered neo-realism more generally). Bailey also talked about other IR theories, but these are less clearly attached to the systemic level: liberal internationalist theories, Marxist and constructivist theories. The international economic system could be connected to Marxist theories, but constructivism really works at the state level (ideals and identity). Liberals tend not to make a distinction between levels, and could arguably be placed any other levels (a reasonable argument is acceptable here).

At the second level belongs those theories that focus on features of the country as the primary explanation for foreign policy: the formal structures of government, institutions and traditions, groups inside and outside of government (cabinet, Congress, business leaders, media, etc), and ideology. Bailey included in the second level the government of the US, decision-making theories, and political culture (anti-statism, liberalism, Manifest Destiny and American exceptionalism). Schmidt puts theories relating to Societal Environment, Government Structure and Bureaucratic at this level.

While in general we did not focus much on “the individual level” in this course, Hook points out a number of factors that could be considered to be at this level of analysis: belief systems, “operational codes” and a series of “shortcuts” that allow individuals to form opinions and act even when (and possibly especially when) information is in short supply. These are: selective perception, use of analogies, cognitive closure and bolstering. Hook also considered personality traits and how these determine the role played by advisors. In discussing G.W. Bush, Hook cites studies that argue that Bush had a high need for power, a sense of control over events and a lack of trust for others. At the same time Bush lacked of confidence with respect to foreign policy relied upon a few key advisors that he did trust, such as Vice President Cheney. Hook does not have much on Obama in this regard. Schmidt does associate the individual level with constructivism, although this is arguable.
2. Med fotfeste særlig i emnets pensum, forklar hvordan og hvorfor måten at staten USA er organisert på og hvilken struktur den har kan påvirke USAs utenrikspolitikk. Gi eksempler.

The required readings would direct students towards these four lines of thought: 1) the basic framework of government as set by the constitution and how that plays out in todays’ foreign policy (Authors that could be relevant here: Hook, Gates, Kyle, Kaye, Baker, Trubowitz & Mellow, lectures, US constitution (founding fathers); 2) how the president organizes his cabinet and advisors (Pfiffner, Hook); 3) Allison’s models, in particular the government politics model and the organizational behavior model (although, these are strictly speaking not specific to the US but are more generally about how organizations work))(Note, the name of the government politics models varies – it is sometimes called the bureaucratic politics model) (relevant authors: Holland and Hook, plus the lectures); 4) group think and similar points (but this could also fall under #2) (discussed in Hook). The good answer should explain the selected line of thought and then provide examples of how this might affect decision-making. For example, the tug of war between Congress and the President with respect to the President’s right to send US troops into battle sometimes places limits on what the President feels he can do. After the Vietnam era, Congress attempted to take back some control over this but with mixed results. Still, the President usually tries to get Congress on board, because while he can order troops into battle without Congressional approval, it is hard to keep them there without Congressional support. This can also be a reason for a President who does not want to act to not act – such as when Obama gave the lack of Congressional support as a reason for not intervening into Syria. There is much to say on points like this.

Note that the constitution does not cover everything that a country has to deal with, and in addition, practice has changed over the life of the country. While the Constitution attempts to divide up power among the branches of government, it is written vaguely enough that what each branch of government is able to do is subject to interpretation (zone of twilight – Hook) and thus changes from time to time and event to event. US foreign policy is accordingly shaped by the political gamesmanship practiced by the three branches (especially Congress and the President) in the context of the separations of power and check and balances aspects of the US government. As they say, “politics is the art of the possible”.

With respect to the other approaches to answering the question: The Hook book states that the Bush administration’s decision-making in the aftermath of 9/11 showed signs of “Group think.” A small group of decision-makers were able to control the decision-making and rapidly came to the decision that Iraq should be invaded. They were able to keep those with contrary views out of the process. The groupthink factor – a group dynamic -- prevented the tough questions from being asked and contrary opinion being seriously considered. Elsewhere (pp 122) Hook describes the management style of the president. He notes that Bush turned to a “small tightly controlled groups of loyalists”. He also favored a formalist style in which in which advisors have sharply defined roles and in which information is channeled to the president through gatekeepers. Obama, like Bush, centralized his inner circle within the White House. His basic model was a “competitive model” in which advisors with different perspectives were encouraged to express their opinions, with the President serving as an “honest broker”. His deliberative model is known as “multiple advocacy”: this means that Obama encouraged all to participate. While Bush is described as not being “curious” about the background or details, Obama prodded people to
explain more fully and to defend their position. He often retired from the discussion without making a decision, and then announced his decision later.

The articles by Pfiffner confirm these positions in large measure, although they make slightly different points. Pfiffner writes of the Bush White House (really the first term), that although key advisors such as Rumsfeld and Cheney had emphasized the importance of good procedure, the White House under George W. Bush did not practice this. Cheney limited access to the president who never heard dissenting views on key issues. In fact, Pfiffner writes that “the pattern that emerges . . . is one of secrecy, top-down control, tightly held information, disregard for the judgements of career professionals and the exclusion from deliberation of qualified executive branch experts who might have disagreed with those who initially framed the decisions.” Career professions were not consulted and when they did manage to express their views, these were ignored. Condoleezza Rice did not play the role of “Honest Broker”. However, there is some evidence that the process was more open during President Bush’s second term.

Pfiffner generally concurs in what Hook writes about Obama, but with a few differences. He does not say that Obama was his own “honest broker” but rather emphasizes that Obama liked to be in control and delved deeply into the policy options himself. Pfiffner agrees that Obama encouraged multiple advocacy and debate and pushed to be presented more information and options. This was particularly true with respect to dealing with the military, which Obama saw as generally uncooperative. Obama used a good deal of time to make his decisions, and was determined not to be pushed into a decision or to let the momentum of past decisions determine future decisions. In sum, Pfiffner says that “President Obama conducted the type of decision-making processes often advocated by political scientists. Obama’s approach guaranteed that he fully examined all serious policy options. Whether or not he made wise decisions is a separate issue.”


Hook’s core idea is that the very sources of US strength are also sources of weakness: among these are deeply ingrained source of national exceptionalism, diffusion and limitations of political powers; the very open and free civil society, and the promotion of free markets at home and abroad.

With respect to power, the student can use Brooks and Wohlforth, Nye, Hook (since this is the vantage point of the question), Schmidt, etc in answering. The most important point with respect to this part of the answer is to have a decent discussion of power.

4. George Kennan er kjent som far til «utenrikspolitikken “containment» (ofte oversatt som «oppdemning»), som var veldig innflytelsesrik under kalde krigen. Den blir tidvis omtalt som USAs
The sources for this answer are the Hook and Hook and Spanier books and the “National Strategy of the United States” published by both the Bush and Obama administrations. The most important part of the answer to display a good knowledge of the general orientation of the two administrations.

With respect to the Bush administration, 9/11 and its aftermath made a great impact on the foreign policy strategy of the United States. Clearly the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq were key events and revealed much about the administration. Most immediately after the 9/11 attack, the US initiated the war on terror, handled its allies who volunteered to help with the Afghanistan invasion somewhat carelessly, and pushed allies (with only mixed success) to support the invasion of Iraq. The US tended to turn to “coalitions of the willing” rather than to its long-standing formal alliances. The US also pursued a particularly ideological quest for regime change (promotion of freedom and democracy). These have long been themes in US foreign policy, but took on a particular potency in Bush’s first term when the so-called “neo-conservatives” were in the ascendency.

In general, the Bush administration, particularly in the president’s first term, showed a tendency towards unilateralism, perhaps because of the US’ “unipolar” position in the world. The Bush administration was very skeptical towards institutions like the UN and refused to ratify, or withdrew from, key international treaties. The national security strategy of the United States explicitly committed the US to the goal of maintaining its military preeminence in the world and to making what it called preemptive attacks (although its wording indicated that the US was committed to a much more aggressive policy of preventative attacks). Bush also declared China to be a strategic competitor (as opposed to a partner, as Clinton had tried to maintain) and took a harder line towards that country. However, the war on terror tended to overshadow this issue and the two countries in fact worked together somewhat against a common foe, “terrorists”. Russia and the US also found common ground in the war on terror, but US-Russian relations were complicated by the expansion of NATO, which the Russians interpreted as a threatening. Tensions arise from this eroded the working relationship between these two countries.

The Obama administration took office with the intent of changing much of what the Bush administration had done. It took a much more multilateral approach, was more reliant upon diplomacy, international organizations and international law, was less assertive and more studied. Obama sought to extract the US from Iraq and Afghanistan and has avoided involving the US in new episodes, such as Syria and Libya. The Obama administration has attempted to work more closely with allies and to decrease the emphasis on military force. In the National Security Strategy of the United States, the Obama administration stated that much of the work to strengthen the US begins in fact at home and outlined the need to improve economic and other conditions within the US.

The Obama administration attempted to “reset” relations with Russia and also to again take up the idea that China is a strategic partner rather than a competitor. At the same time, the Obama administration has pursued a policy of strategic re-orientation towards the
Pacific Ocean region (the Pivot towards Asia), and has worked to strengthen relationships with countries around China and throughout the Pacific (Obama has just visited Vietnam and announced ending the last embargos on that country).

However, events have intervened to hinder the administration in its attempt to reset US foreign policy. Obama found it impossible (so far) to close Guantanamo Bay (although torture seems to have ended) and although it does not talk about the war on terror, still pursues and aggressive policy against terrorists – for example using drones to kill terrorists in other countries. The intent to focus more on Asia has been overshadowed by other events, particularly the Arab spring and its aftermath (including Syria) and Iran. Obama’s less aggressive and more cooperative stance was demonstrated by his support for (but not leadership of) the intervention in Libya and the reluctance to get involved in Syria. However, the emergence of ISIS (or ISIL or whatever) and subsequent terror attacks have worked to draw the US in to some degree in Syria (although the US resists sending much in the way of ground troops). Relations with Russia have also deteriorated with the Russian invasions of Crimea and Ukraine.

5. I boka “American Policy since WWII” (skrevet av Hook og Spanier), skriver forfatterne om den “amerikanske tilnærmingen til utenrikspolitikk”. Trekk på det de skiver og andre ressurser brukt i emnet (pensum litteratur og forelesninger): Hva er den «amerikanske tilnærmingen til utenrikspolitikk?»

The Hook and Spanier book states that: « ... the United states has long approached world politics with a peculiar national style that reflects the inescapable demands posed by the interstate system along with the nation’s geographical position and abundant natural resources. .... American foreign policy has been further shaped by long-standing cultural values and their impacts on the nation’s identity and definitions of friends and enemies ....”.

So this question is an invitation to reflect upon what national style this mixture of factors has produced. There are many ways to go here. What is required of any answer is something more than statements such as “Americans think themselves better that everybody else”.

That is just general chat; what is needed is something specific, demonstrating background knowledge. So terms like “manifest destiny” or “exceptionalism” (American or national) should be defined: they have content. (Note: the exact definition of these terms tends to vary by writer, but even so, the student should have a definite definition of what it is). Hook and Spanier talk about the “American Sense of Destiny” which includes an American sense of mission and a sense of exceptionalism.

In his own book, Hook also writes about the U.S: national style. Elements of this are: national exceptionalism, moral righteousness (defining issues in terms of good and evil), and a general disinterest in foreign stuff until something dramatic happens: then the attitude is that “this” can and should be fixed. Hook also writes of manifest destiny.

Students might draw upon the article by Kagan in connection with all this. In his article, “Power and Weakness”; Kagan observes that Americans and Europeans think differently (Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus) and makes three main points: 1) The power difference between the two is highly important, about which he says:
Today, Americans make the dinner, Europeans do the dishes; Europe would not pay to develop military forces, and cashed in their peace dividend; Appeasement is for Europeans a sophisticated strategy, not a fearful mentality; Weaker powers have always wanted to inhibit stronger powers from using force. This is the psychology of weakness, perfectly understandable human psychology; Europe is characterized by the failure to respond to threats and also denial of threats; US feels threatened because as the leading power, it is more of a target than Europe is; 2) the emergence of different strategic cultures. European institutions produce internal Kantian peace; US outside the system as guarantor. It is stuck in history (in the sense of Fukuyama); 3) Materiel and ideological differences reinforce each other. The US has no choice but to act unilaterally. Europe will not do what it takes to assume its role. This will lead to increased transatlantic tensions.

If relevant: the student can draw upon lectures. Bailey talked about “anti-statism”, Liberalism (especially classical liberalism), “American exceptionalism” and “manifest destiny”; By “anti-statism” Bailey means the dislike that Americans seem to have for a strong central government (and government solutions to various social ills). This is supported by: 1) the political philosophy of classical liberalism with its notion of the limited need for the state and stress on the significance of the individual (this is the tradition of John Locke); 2) the enshrinement (and freezing) of this political philosophy in the Constitution; 3) the Protestant tradition in the US (strong individualist overtones for example); and 4) the multiplicity of churches in the US that meant resistance to a strong state that might impose uniformity. Students might also talk about Capitalism as a major support of the liberal ideology.