Identifications: Based readings and class lectures, explain the significance of two of the following. Each answer is worth 25%:

1. Gross National Cool
   **Answer:** Gross National Cool: A term coined by Colin McGray, this is a form of soft power, refers to non-traditional ways that one nation can influence the values, world view, desires, and consumption patterns of another. “Cool” in this case refers to the intrinsic attractiveness of a nation’s culture stemming from its underlying artistic vibrancy. A nation with a “cool” culture has more opportunities to get its messages across, and hence more opportunities to influence others. Gross National Cool thus refers to the sum of the nation’s attractive or “cool” culture, and is a takeoff on the economic term “Gross National Product.”

2. US-Japan Alliance
   **Answer:** Officially inaugurated in September 1951 when the two countries signed their first security treaty several hours after the San Francisco Peace treaty had been signed by Japan and several non-communist allied powers, including the US. This original security treaty was highly unequal, giving the US the right to intervene domestically in Japan to restore order and arrest Japanese. This original treaty also gave the US the right to use bases in Japan but did not formally obligate the US to defend Japan, although it would have been hard for the US not to defend Japan given the presence of US. In 1960 this treaty was replaced by a new treaty that abolished the US military’s extra-territorial authority in Japan, and committed the US to defending Japan. However, this new treaty, like the previous one, did not commit Japan to defend the US in anyway. The new treaty continued to provide the US with military bases in Japan, although it included a clause calling for the US to consult with Japan before using the bases for purposes other than the defense of Japan. Cooperation between the US military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (especially the land forces), was quite limited before the first US-Japan Defense Guidelines were concluded in 1978.

3. Sakuradamon Incident
**Answer:** An attack staged outside the Sakuradamon gate outside the Shogun’s castle (Edo castle, the present-day Imperial Palace in Tokyo) on the entourage of Ii Naosuke, a top minister in the government of the Tokugawa Bakufu, and an advocate of opening Japan to the outside world. Ii, was a feudal lord loyal to the Tokugawa Shogun (a so-called fudai lord), and had forcefully promoted Japan’s opening, including a commercial treaty with the US (the so-called Harris Treaty). The incident, instigated by opponents of opening Japan, ended in Ii’s assassination, and undermined further efforts to open up Japan. This also an important milestone in the weakening of the Tokugawa government that eventually led to its overthrow in 1868 by the combined efforts of the feudal domains of Choshu and Satsuma, and the so-called Meiji Restoration of Imperial rule.

4. **Convoy system**

**Answer:** A system of negotiation and state guidance to help mediate business cycles, differential access to capital and large-firm market power over their smaller and weaker rivals. It operates via semi-governmental intermediaries (such as Gaikaku Dantai, which include special corporations and public corporations, Koueki houjin), private foundations and industry associations. The convoy system aims at reducing various dislocations, allowing even ailing companies to stay in the market. Market exit is discouraged and collaboration within an industry is promoted in order to build the skills of individual firms, the industry as a whole, and even regions. Ailing companies that cannot be save in this way tend to be merged into stronger companies. On the downside, merging weaker firms into stronger ones can weaken the stronger firms, and discouraging weaker firms from exiting a market through support by other firms can burden the entire industry and discourage new and potentially innovative firms from entering the market.

**Essays:** **Answer only 1 question based upon class readings and lectures. This answer is worth 50%:**

1. Describe and analyse John Dower’s argument about the impact the “revolution from above” had on the development of post-war democracy. What are the strengths and weaknesses of his argument and ultimately how credible is it?

**Answer:** Dower describes the reforms imposed on Japan by the US occupying forces just after the end of the Pacific War as a democratic “revolution from above.”
revolution featured the implementation or restoration of democracy, giving women the right to vote for the first time, the granting of theoretically unfettered freedom of speech and democracy, freeing all political prisoners, recognizing the right to unionize and strike for better working conditions, and other human rights. It also included important economic reforms, such as breaking up the large family-owned conglomerates, or Zaibatsu, and land reform that ended tenant farming and produced a large new class of small land-holding farmers. Dower calls the 1946 Japanese constitution, largely drafted by the US occupying forces, the pinnacle of this radical reform. He argues that this revolution from above was inherently contradictory, because it was democracy by fiat. There was no precedent for “a genuinely democratic revolution” being “associated with military dictatorship.” US General Douglas MacArthur, as the Allied Supreme Commander, behind the façade of a democratically elected legislature and a cabinet chosen by that legislature, ruled Japan like a neo-colonial dictator with legislative as well as executive authority. Moreover, although free speech was granted the press was subject to US military censorship throughout the occupation. Also, this revolution had been received as a free gift rather than earned or fought for. Because democracy had arrived without struggle, it arguably failed to establish deep roots. Democratization from above “tended to reinforce…‘a logic of irresponsibility’ whereby everyone was socialized to bow to orders from superiors.” Moreover, this revolution was subject to the changing interests of its bestower, such that the US started to reign in and even repress Socialists, Communists, and labor unions that were pursuing their own version of a revolution from below when Washington became increasingly preoccupied with the emerging Cold War and the perceived threat of leftist subversion. Dower’s analysis implies that Japanese democracy might never have taken firm root, and has been fragile, and perhaps even vulnerable to right-wing attempts to subvert it. Certainly, this has been the perception of many in Japan, especially those on the left, who have long clung to occupation reforms and have opposed any attempt to change the constitution, fearing that pre-war conservative forces would use any change as an opportunity to overturn this fragile democracy bestowed from above. They point to politicians like Kishi Nobusuke, who served as the munitions minister in Tojo’s wartime cabinet, and who, as prime Minister in the late 1950s, promoted the revision of Japan’s post-war constitution and the reversal of some occupation reforms. More recently those who fear for the sustainability of post-war democracy have pointed to Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Kishi’s grandson, and an avid follower of Kishi, who has not only called for constitutional reform, but also for ending the “post-war regime.” In short, public passiveness, and deference to authority, two characteristics of the
revolution from above, can empower conservative elites to roll back Japan’s democracy. On the other hand, after more than 60 years of democracy, freedom of speech, assembly, and other fundamental rights, one can argue that Japanese democracy, irrespective of its early post-war beginnings, is by now well established, and that Japanese today are no longer deferential to authority or passive. The willingness of Japanese citizens to vote Abe’s conservative LDP out of power in 2009 is reflective of the maturity of Japanese democracy. The fact that most Japanese now appear to trust civilian control over the military can be seen as another indicator of growing confidence in Japan’s democratic institutions.

2. Despite the emergence of a post-war culture of anti-militarism, Japan has experienced difficulty re-establishing trust with former victims of Japan’s pre-1945 expansionism. Explain how this post-war political culture has aided and/or obstructed relations with Asian nations.

**Answer:** Japan’s post-war culture of anti-militarism aided the achievement of conditional trust with Asian nations because it caused Japan to uphold its war-renouncing constitution and promise not to become a military power, defined as the ability to invade and occupy others, and formally articulated in the so-called Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. However, this conditional trust is not the same thing as unconditional trust, meaning that if Japan again became a military power it would not be trusted. Indeed, Japan’s low military profile has prevented it from building a track record as a trustable military power. Second, Japan’s culture of anti-militarism pinned almost all the blame for Japan’s pre-1945 expansionism on the military, largely absolving other social groups and society at large. Consequently, this culture implied the necessity of reassuring Japan’s own populace and neighboring countries alike that extremely strict civilian control and limits on the size and capabilities of the SDF would ensure that the Japanese military could never spin out of control as was believed to be the case with the pre-war military. Because Japan’s culture of anti-militarism, by portraying average Japanese and Asians alike as victims, it was not obvious to Japanese that they needed to apologize to Asians for wartime aggression and more generally reassure Asians that Japan shared their view of history. Thus, Japan’s post-war culture of anti-militarism caused Japan to focus military reassurance (imposing unilateral constraints on national military power) and to initially overlook historical reassurance (convincing former victims that one shares their view of past aggression and that therefore this aggression will not be repeated).